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Under a little-known agreement with the major television networks,
the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy reviewed the
scripts of more than ioo episodes of television shows such as "E.R.,"
"Beverly Hills 902io," and "Cosby." This review took place often
before the shows aired. In exchange for broadcasting programming
that the White House found to convey "proper" anti-drug messages,
the networks received more than $20 million worth of credit for
required public service broadcasting.'
Hundreds of local television news stations reaching tens of millions of
households around the country ran prepackaged video news segments
produced and distributed by the federal government. The segments
lauded a broad range of government policies and initiatives, from high
profile issues like regime change in Iraq and Medicare reform to less
prominent matters such as efforts to offer free after-school tutoring or
to fight holiday drunk driving. Absent any attribution to the
government, many segments concluded with individuals signing off,
stating, for example, "In Washington, I'm Karen Ryan reporting," or
* Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law. A.B., Harvard University, 1992; M.Phil. Cambridge
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grateful to Rick Abel, Evan Caminker, Ariela Dubler, Amanda Frost, Robert Goldstein, Risa
Goluboff, Vicki Jackson, Kenneth Karst, Russell Korobkin, Martha Minow, Nina Pillard, Laura
Rosenbury, Bill Rubenstein, Fred Schauer, Rich Schragger, Seana Shiffrin, David Sklansky, Clyde
Spillenger, Jon Varat, Eugene Volokh, Jay Wexler, and Stephen Yeazell. For research support and
funding, I am indebted to June Kim, Linda O'Connor, the Hugh and Hazel Darling Law Library, and
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i. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Drug Office Will End Scrutiny of TV Scripts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2000, at A15; see also Glenn Burkins & Joe Flint, Subplot: Networks Let White House Vet Show to
Push Antidrug Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2000, at BI; Howard Kurtz & Sharon Waxman, White House
Cut Anti-Drug Deal With TV; Ad Credits Given For "Proper Message," WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 20oo, at
As; Marc Lacey & Bill Carter, In Trade-Off With TV Networks, Drug Office is Reviewing Scripts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2oo0, at At. For a further discussion of the details of the arrangements, see also All
Things Considered: Director Pancho Kinney of the White House Drug Policy Office on the Public-
Service Anti-Drug Cooperative Arrangements Between Media and the Government (NPR radio
broadcast, Jan. 20, 2000) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
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"In Washington, I'm Alberto Garcia reporting."'
In Rust v. Sullivan, doctors received federal funding to provide family
planning counseling to patients but were prohibited from discussing
abortion as a method of family planning. The program did not require
the doctors to disclose that the content of their advice was constrained
by government directives.3
The Supreme Court issued McCulloch v. Maryland, a controversial
federalism decision that prompted an outpouring of criticism from
defenders of states' rights. Concerned about the risk that the criticism
posed to the Court and the Union, the Chief Justice published a series
of newspaper essays defending the Court's decision. He signed the
essays, "A Friend to the Union," or "A Friend of the Constitution.,
4
In each of these examples, the government, or a government official,
sought to disseminate its preferred views in a manner that obscured the
government's role in promoting the message. The anti-drug messages
appeared to be coming solely from the networks; the news segments,
from the reporters; the counseling, from the doctors; and the essays, from
a concerned "friend." These examples are far from exhaustive. Though
the full extent of this practice is necessarily difficult to measure, recent
reports suggest that federal, state, and local government entities and
officials may engage in pseudonymous or anonymous communications
more often than we might imagine.' These types of communications-
2. See David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, A New Age of Prepackaged News, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Ai.
News segments produced and distributed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
about Medicare reform received significant public criticism and attention. See Matter of: Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.-Video News Releases, File B-
302710 (General Accounting Office, May 19, 2004) [hereinafter Matter of: Dep't of Health and
Human Servs.]; see also Amy Goldstein, GAO Says HHS Broke Laws With Medicare Videos, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2004, at Ai; Vicki Kemper, Mock News on Medicare Called Illegal, L.A. TIMES, May 20,
2004, at At6; Robert Pear, Ruling Says White House's Medicare Videos Were Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2004, at A24.
3. Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S. I73, 178-81 (i99I).
4. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLANO 1-21 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
5. Recent news reports detail that a syndicated broadcast host received a $240,0o0 payment from
the U.S. Department of Education to promote White House education policy, that two syndicated
newspaper columnists wrote in support of the Administration's marriage policy after receiving
payments to assist officials in developing and implementing that policy, and that none of the
commentators disclosed their ties to the government. See Anne E. Kornblut, Third Journalist Was
Paid to Promote Bush Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at A5; Howard Kurtz, Writer Backing Bush
Plan Had Gotten Federal Contract, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2005, at CI; Mark Silva, U.S. Paid Pundit to
Push Program; Media Group Drops Commentator over $240,ooo Deal, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2005, at CI.
Other examples that have received public attention include op-eds and editorials published in the
198os. The op-eds were part of a "campaign to influence the public and the Congress to support
increased funding for the Administration's Central American policies." See Matter of: To the Hon.
Jack Brooks, 66 Comp. Gen. 707, File B-229o69 (General Accounting Office, Sept. 30, 1987)
[hereinafter Matter of: To the Hon. Jack Brooks]; see also Richard L. Berke, State Dept. Linked to
Contra Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1987, at A3; Doyle McManus, GAO Says State Dept. Ran Illegal
Propaganda Effort, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1987, at I-i. A professor signed one op-ed noting his university
affiliation but omitting his role as a State Department consultant on those policies and his
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those that do not reveal the government as their source-are the subject
of this Article.
The Chief Justice's identity remained largely concealed for
generations following the publication of his essays. By contrast, the
government role in the other three contexts received significant, if not
immediate, public attention and criticism. Commentators called the
television programs a form of "mind control,"7 an "improper cooptation
of supposedly independent media,"8 and "an outrageous abandonment of
the First Amendment."9 Nearly forty thousand citizens signed a petition
calling on the Federal Communications Commission, Congress, and local
broadcasters to stop the broadcasting of video news segments absent
government attribution,"° while the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
issued a memorandum to executive branch departments and agencies
advising that the segments violated federal laws banning the use of
appropriations for propaganda purposes." A group of grantees and
collaboration with State Department employees in writing the op-ed. See Matter of: To the Hon. Jack
Brooks, supra, at 1-2. Two foreign opposition leaders signed similar op-eds without disclosing the
State Department's role in preparing the pieces. See id. at 1-3. The editorials supported the White
House's proposed transfer of the Small Business Administration (SBA) to the Department of
Commerce. See Matter of: Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 2, at II (discussing GAO
File B-229257). The SBA "prepared the[] editorials and provided them to newspapers around the
country to run as the position of the recipient newspapers without disclosing to the readers of those
editorials that SBA was the source of the information." Id.
Recent reports suggest that state governments, too, engage in these types of veiled
communications. See Barstow & Stein, supra note 2, at Ai (noting that "the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department alone has produced some 500 video news releases since 1993"); Dion Nissenbaum,
Schwarzenegger Videos The Latest Flap Over Prepackaged News Stories, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 13, 2005, at IA (noting that California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and former California
Governor Gray Davis both issued video news releases).
6. See Matter of: Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 2, at ii; see also Gerald
Gunther, John Marshall, "A Friend of the Constitution ": In Defense and Elaboration of McCulloch v.
Maryland, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449, 449-5o (1969).
7. John Podhoretz, TV Antidrug Messages Are No Scandal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 200, at A22
(quoting "Harvard media eminence Bill Kovach").
8. Editorial, TV and Propaganda (Cont'd), WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at A28.
9. Lacey & Carter, supra note I, at AI (quoting Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Media Access
Project).
Io. William Fisher, Media: Bush to Continue Producing "Packaged News Stories," IPS-I, ER
PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 29, 2005. Also, two Senators and two media advocacy groups asked the Federal
Communications Commission to investigate the propriety of the broadcasters' use of the video news
segments. See id.; William Triplett, Orgs Seek FCC Review of Bush Vids, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 22,
2005, at 6.
I I. See Circular on Prepackaged News Stories, File B-30 4 272 (General Accounting Office, Feb.
17, 2005) [hereinafter Matter of: Prepackaged News Stories]. The GAO found that the segments
violated the standard prohibition in many appropriations laws providing that "[n]o part of any
appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes
within the United States not heretofore authorized by the Congress." See id. at 2 (quoting the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. IO8-447, § 624, 118 Stat. 2809, 3278 (Dec. 8,
2004)); see also Matter of: Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 2, at 1o (discussing the
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. io8-7, § 626, 117 Stat. I1, 470 (2003));
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
doctors who supervised the use of the family planning funds brought suit
against the federal government challenging the legality and
constitutionality of the counseling restrictions."
In response, government officials offered a variety of rationales for
their actions. For the anti-drug television programs, White House
officials stressed the importance of the message and effectiveness of the
means chosen. They claimed that "it's important to get the anti-drug
message out in as many ways as we can,"' 3 and described the media
arrangement as simply an "innovative" way of "getting anti-drug
messages out."' 4 Federal officials emphasized the widespread use of
video news releases. Spokespersons from the United States Department
of Health and Human Services, for instance, pointed out that they "are
everywhere"; their use "is a common, routine practice in government and
the private sector."' 5 As long as the video releases were "purely
see also Matter of: To the Hon. Jack Brooks, supra note 5 (discussing the Departments of Commerce,
Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411,
§ 501, 98 Stat. 1545 (1984)). The laws do not define the term "propaganda," and it does not appear
that any federal court has attempted to interpret it. The GAO, however, has repeatedly interpreted it
to include, among other things, materials that are misleading as to source. See Matter of: Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., supra note 2, at io-ii (discussing various GAO opinions); Matter of:
Prepackaged News Stories, supra, at 2. The GAO also concluded that the expenditure of funds to
produce the video segments violated the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000), which
prohibits federal employees from making expenditures that exceed available budget authority. See
Matter of: Prepackaged News Stories, supra, at 2 n.3.
As the Administration pointed out in response to the GAO memorandum, see Memorandum
from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Heads of Departments and
Agencies, Re: Use of Government Funds for Video News Releases, File M-o5-1o (Mar. II, 2005), the
GAO's legal opinions are not binding on the executive branch or the judiciary. Delta Chem. Corp. v.
West, 33 F.3d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n, 23 F.3d 257, 262
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 7 87, 80 4 (6th Cir. '99I).
In response to the recent reports about paid commentators promoting White House education
and marriage policies, see supra note 5, several members of Congress have proposed bills to make the
prohibition on "covert propaganda" a permanent part of the U.S. Code. See Rhonda Chriss Lokeman,
Fakers and Frauds Fool American Taxpayers, KAN. CrrY STAR, Feb. 16, 2005, at B9.
I2. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173-74 (199i).
13. Associated Press, Anti-drug Offer Miffs Bosses of TV Studios, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000, at
C12.
14. Burkins & Flint, supra note I, at Bi. The director of the White House's drug policy office
explained, "what we are running is a public-health communications campaign." All Things Considered,
supra note I.
The networks, too, defended the anti-drug programs, but focused instead on their ultimate
decision-making authority. See, e.g., Burkins & Flint, supra note i, at B i; Networks Trade Integrity for
a Few Commercials, USA TODAY, Jan. 17 2ooo, at i4A. A CBS spokesperson, for example, reported,
"[alt no time has the independence or creative integrity of our programming been compromised."
Burkins & Flint, supra note I, at Bi. Likewise, an NBC executive stated, "We never ceded content
control to the ONDCP [Office of National Drug Control Policy] or any other government
department." Id.
15. Goldstein, supra note 2, at AI; Robert Pear, U.S. Videos, for TV News, Come Under Scrutiny,
N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at Ai. The officials also stated that the government was "required to
inform beneficiaries about changes in Medicare," and the television news segments were "a legal,
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informational" and did not involve "advocacy," the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel stated, they did not constitute
"propaganda" in violation of the appropriations laws. ,6 Defending the
restrictions on health care professionals, the Solicitor General's office
pointed to, and the Supreme Court accepted, the government's
prerogative to shape the family planning counseling that it was funding.'7
The Supreme Court echoed this view, stating that "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is
entitled to define the limits of that program.' 8 Although Chief Justice
Marshall did not publicly defend his writing, he did worry about its
appropriateness. He apparently questioned whether he, as a government
official, should write at all. As Gerald Gunther recounts, "[t]he Chief
Justice was sufficiently concerned about proprieties to conceal his
identity, but not enough to abstain from writing."' 9
In each of the four cases, the government officials either failed to
acknowledge or expressly rejected the idea of disclosing the
governmental role in promoting the message. Administration officials
did not concede that the doctors receiving family planning funds should
at least have informed their patients of the government-imposed
restrictions.0 Nor does it appear that the Chief Justice considered
indicating that the "friend" worked as a government official.' In the
news video and anti-drug contexts, public commentators explicitly called
for the government to require the news segments22 and entertainment
effective way to educate beneficiaries." Id.
16. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
to the General Counsels of the Executive Branch, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Whether
Appropriations May be Used for Informational Video News Releases (Mar. i, 2005). The Office of
Legal Counsel concluded that the video news segments concerning Medicare reform were purely
informational and thus did not constitute illegal propaganda. See also Memorandum from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alex M. Azar II,
General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Re: Expenditure of Appropriated
Funds for Informational Video News Releases, at www.usdoj.gov/olc/opfinal.htm (July 30, 2004).
17. See Brief for Respondent at 19-3 i , Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (I99x) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-
1392).
18. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
19. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 4, at 13.
20. As discussed further below, see infra text accompanying note 339, the Supreme Court noted
that the federal program did not prohibit the doctors from disclosing the counseling restrictions. Rust,
500 U.S. at 203.
21. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 4, at I-2I; see also
Gunther, supra note 6, at 449-55.
22. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Lies, Bribes and Hidden Costs, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2004/04/5/medicare/print.html (Apr. 5, 2004) (quoting a Duke University professor, stating "Why not
do a straightforward public service announcement and identify the source of information? Why have
people pretend to be journalists? ... It's outrageous that viewers were being duped."); Bush Defiant
Over Prepackaged "News," TELEVISION WK., Mar. 21, 2005, at 8 ("The government has the right to
send out promotional video news releases as long as they're labeled as such."); Murray Light, "News"
Items Hurt Bush's Credibility, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 27, 2005, at 13 (calling for a "government [disclosure]
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programs 3 to indicate the fact of government support. The decision to
inform the viewers, government officials responded, lay in the hands of
the television stations and networks. Pressed on why the government
does not require disclosure, the President stated, "the local stations
ought to, if there's a deep concern about that, ought to tell their viewers
what they're watching." 4 Similarly, concerning the anti-drug programs,
the White House took the position that "it was not the government's
place to notify viewers of the drug office's arrangement with the
networks."25
This Article takes the opposite position. It argues that, when the
government participates in public debate, it should make the fact of its
participation transparent. Relying in part on social science research to
examine the role of government communications in public debate,26 the
requirement that would be enforced by penalties"); Clarence Page, Fake News Makes Foul
Government, CHI. TRIB., Mar. I6, 2005, at C23 ("All [White House] administrations use public funds to
push their agendas one way or another, but they should also make a decent effort to inform the public
as to where the hype is coming from."); Viewer Beware, WASH. POST, Mar. I6, 2005, at A22 ("[Wihy,
exactly, wouldn't the administration want to let the people in on one of the most salient facts: who,
really, is doing the talking?"); When the News Isn't the News, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 20, 2005, at 4L ("At
the very least, the Federal Communications Commission should require that stations identify
government-produced reports.").
Many commentators also called on the news media to disclose the government as the source of
the video segments. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor: Hidden News and Government Spin, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. I6, 2005, at A22; Naming Sources: Government-Produced "News" Should be Clearly Identified,
COLUMBus DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2005, at 12A; Two-Way Street, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. i8, 2005, at
A18; Jon Carroll, Daily Datebook, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2005, at C8.
23. See, e.g., Feds, TV Networks on Slippery Slope, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIOENCER, Jan. 20, 2000, at
A12 ("[S]omehow, no one has decided to take the absolutely-minimum step of notifying the public
every time that a program is cooperating with the National Youth Media Campaign."); Robert Scheer,
Skip the ist Amendment, Just Give 'Em Their Profits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. i8, 2000, at B7; Marjorie
Williams, But Really, What Was Sold?, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at A29; Drugs, TV and Propaganda,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, zooo, at A24 ("Unlike viewers of anti-drug ads, viewers of these [entertainment]
programs don't know that they are receiving government-sponsored political messages.").
24. News Conference, President George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents (Mar. i6,
2005). Similarly, in justifying the distribution of Medicare reform news video segments, a Health and
Human Services ("HHS") spokesperson stated, "We left the decisions [on the news segments] directly
in the hands of the TV producer in terms of what to use and how to use it, including attribution."
Emily Pierce, HHS Erred on Videos, GAO Finds, ROLL CALL, May 20, 2004. An HHS spokesperson
also stated, "T"V stations knew the [Medicare] videos came from us and could have identified the
government as the source if they had wanted to." Pear, supra note 2, at A24. Asked if members of the
public could justifiably be angry about not being informed of the source of the mock news story, the
spokesperson responded, "If I'm a viewer, I'd be angry at my television station." Kemper, supra note
2, at A16.
25. Burkins & Flint, supra note I, at BI (emphasis added). In response to public criticism, the
White House eventually revised its approach with the networks, continuing to reward networks for
showing programs with anti-drug themes, but discontinuing its practice of reviewing scripts or
suggesting changes before the programs aired. See Associated Press, Drug Czar Sets Broadcast
Guidelines, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2ooo, at B8; Joe Flint, White House to Review Incentive Plan For TV
Networks' Antidrug Messages, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at A3; Van Natta, supra note I, at AI5. It did
not, however, adopt a disclosure requirement.
26. By "government communications," I refer broadly to the myriad ways in which the
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Article argues that the legitimacy of those communications depends on
the public's ability to identify what the government says and how it does
so. It maintains that the constitutional commitment to political
accountability counsels governmental actors to ensure the transparency
of government communications and that those actors may avoid the
principle of transparency only in exceptional cases. The Article also
argues that courts have a role to play in enforcing the transparency
principle. Although the principle does not give rise to a judicially
enforceable right, courts should take transparency into account in cases
involving what this Article refers to as the "government speech"
defense -cases in which litigants assert First Amendment claims, and the
government seeks to justify its alleged speech-infringing actions on the
ground that it is merely exercising the government's broad latitude to
speak. Though five Justices of the Supreme Court earlier this month
declined to incorporate transparency into the Court's assessment of a
government speech defense in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association," the majority approach in that case was misguided, for it
failed adequately to account for the essentially private nature of the
speech at issue and the important structural considerations implicated by
the challenged program.
In making this argument, this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I
starts with some background. It introduces the concept of government
communications and explains that such communications, even if
primarily informational in nature, ultimately seek to persuade. It then
reviews the underlying conceptions of government persuasion in the
existing doctrine and literature on government communications.
Responding to those conceptions, Part II presents contemporary social
science research on how people receive and evaluate messages and how
knowledge of the speaker's identity may affect that process. It explains
how people process messages in general and governmental messages in
particular. Consistent with common sense assumptions, but contrary to
common premises in First Amendment and public deliberation theories,
people do not simply focus on the arguments presented. Rather, they
employ two modes of processing, one that corresponds to attention to
arguments, and another that relies on simple decision rules or cues. Part
II then turns to the "government" cue, and discusses how and why the
significance of that cue varies from context to context.
The next three Parts focus on the issue of transparency. Part III
points to the prevalence of non-transparent government communications
government communicates, whether the speaker be a politician, civil servant, agency, or other, and
whether the form is written, spoken, on-line, or visual. See infra Part I.A. By "government," I refer to
all levels of the American government, federal, state, and locl.
27. 544 U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2058-68 (2005).
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and argues that two factors -advances in technology and the blurring of
the public/private distinction-will only increase the frequency of such
communications. Part III also explains how non-transparent
communications affect public debate. It draws again on social science
literature to show that the lack of transparency creates substantial
problems for political accountability: not only can a government (or in
fact any speaker) conceal its role in promoting particular messages, but it
can enhance its messages' persuasiveness by using a variety of source
cues, such as credibility, popularity, or agreement by independent
sources. The government, in other words, may make its views appear to
be held by more esteemed or authoritative sources than they necessarily
are, and more widely accepted than they really are.
Part IV then explains the constitutional dimension of the
transparency principle. It argues that governments should not have the
same freedom to speak as private parties, and that that difference results
from the constitutional commitment to political accountability. It also
maintains that, notwithstanding the various reasons why we might prefer
governments sometimes to speak non-transparently, the rationale for
recognizing the right of private parties to speak anonymously or
pseudonymously does not apply with equal force to government
speakers. Put another way, Part IV acknowledges the costs of following
the transparency principle, but concludes that the Constitution calls for,
and the benefits to political accountability justify, tolerating those costs.
Part V discusses the practical implications of the transparency
principle. Part V first makes clear that, except in rare circumstances,
governments should ensure that recipients of government messages
understand the government's responsibility for the speech. In elaborating
that standard, Part V clarifies that, because of the difficulties identifying
when government officials or employees speak in their private or official
capacities as well as the need to protect individual First Amendment
rights, the transparency principle ought not to apply when it is
reasonable to conclude that the officials or employees speak, at least in
part, on their own accord. Yet when a private party receives government
subsidies for expressive purposes, the government should require the
private party to disclose that fact. Part V acknowledges that there may be
certain circumstances in which the transparency principle ought not to
apply.
Part V then takes up the issue of judicial enforceability. This Part
argues that, given judicial management and competence concerns, as well
as the need to avoid chilling private speech, the transparency principle
does not give rise to a judicially enforceable right, but instead primarily
serves as a hortatory constitutional ideal to which all governmental
actors should adhere. Yet the transparency principle is still relevant to
the work of the courts. It is a factor that courts should take into account
[Vol. 56:983
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when individuals raise First Amendment challenges to government
action and the government defends by claiming that the contested
program involves government speech. Addressing the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Johanns, Part V argues that the government should not be
able to assert that defense unless it can show, at a minimum, that the
reasonable recipient of the speech understands that speech to originate
from the government. A brief conclusion follows.
For three reasons, this Article devotes considerable attention to the
social science research on message processing. First, despite the
research's centrality to questions about the function and impact of
speech, the legal literature concerning speech has largely overlooked this
research . This omission is particularly striking, as legal scholars have
paid increasing attention to social science research in addressing other
areas of the law. Second, although the social science research in many
ways comports with common sense understandings of how people
process messages, much of the legal doctrine and literature on speech
reflect inaccurate assumptions about the ways in which people actually
process messages. For example, one of the foundational principles
informing First Amendment doctrine, the Holmesian view that "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market,"29 is overstated and does not take basic social
science conclusions into account.3" Although the legal literature does not
necessarily adopt the Holmesian view, some scholarship, including much
concerning government speech, reveals other overly simplified
assumptions.3'
Third, and finally, the social science research helps to provide a
fuller picture of the impact of the lack of transparency on political
accountability. One could argue for the transparency principle without
any discussion of the research on message processing. If we knew only
that citizens could not identify non-transparent government speech and
thereby could not hold the government accountable for it, that would be
a sufficient basis for the argument that non-transparent communications
conflict with the constitutional commitment to political accountability.
By enabling a richer examination of the ways in which non-transparent
communications interfere with political accountability,3" the social
science literature helps to make the case for transparency even stronger.
28. For examples of legal scholarship on speech incorporating relevant social science research,
see Paul S. Horwitz, Free Speech As Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEmp. L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go
to Extremes, 1Io YALE L.J. 71, 81-84 (2000) (discussing cascade effects of social influence).
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 ('919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
30. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part III.B.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Our federal, state, and local governments regularly communicate
their views to the public. A mayor delivers a speech on the importance of
voting. The Surgeon General issues a report on the health risks of
smoking. A public high school invites a motivational speaker to
encourage self-esteem and resistance to peer pressure. A television
commercial portrays a Native American, on finding litter and pollution,
shedding a tear. In live speeches, broadcasted debates, or published
reports, or through website postings, catchy slogans, or glossy images,
government communications pervade the social and political life of our
nation.33
Like any entity that itself cannot literally speak, a government must
speak through the voices or efforts of others.34 Politicians, official
spokespersons, or other employees may speak in their official capacities,
or offices, agencies, or departments may author pamphlets, reports, or
announcements. A government depends not only on individuals or
organizations that are formally part of the government to convey its
messages, but also on private individuals or organizations. Often
pursuant to contract or grant, and sometimes pursuant to regulation,
such private parties assist governments in disseminating arguments and
ideas favored by the government. 3 In some cases, private parties, such as
advertising agencies, simply help produce messages that government
bodies then convey. In other cases, private parties, such as paid
endorsers, themselves deliver the messages to audiences.
A government communicates for a variety of reasons. It may, for
example, seek to inform the public of matters the government deems
relevant, to rally support for governmental policies and practices, to
encourage or deter certain behavior, or to communicate shared values
and perspectives. In doing so, a government seeks to shape public
awareness, influence public opinion, or secure popular support. In other
words, notwithstanding the myriad of apparent intentions, government
communications generally entail an element of persuasion. As Mark
Yudof has aptly remarked, "[ilnevitably, government, or those who are a
33. Of course the government also communicates, or expresses, its views through the law itself.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 943 (1995). I focus
here on the government's efforts to participate in public debate in the more traditional sense. Whereas
people generally know of the government's responsibility for laws and regulations, they do not, as I
discuss below, necessarily know of its responsibility for speech.
34. See generally Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, I 12 HARV.
L. REV. 84 (1998).
35. The government's use of private parties to convey its messages parallels the government's use
of private parties to perform traditional governmental functions, and thus contributes to the blurring
of the traditional public/private distinction. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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part of it, seeks to persuade citizens to act, or to allow it to act differently
than they would have without the information supplied by the
government." 6
B. CONCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT PERSUASION
The propriety and legitimacy of a government's powers of
communication and persuasion in a democracy have been the subject of
considerable disagreement. Courts and commentators have espoused a
broad range of views on the proper role of, and limits on, government
speech in public debate. At one end of the spectrum is the view that
governments should have broad latitude to engage freely and fully in
persuasive communications.37 On this view, governments play an
important role in contributing to public debate about all sorts of matters,
and government communications generally ought to be welcomed and
encouraged 5 At the other end of the spectrum lies the view that it is
generally improper for governments to engage in normative discussions
about matters of public import.39  On that view, government
communications, particularly those taking a position on contested social
or political issues, do not enhance, but instead endanger the flourishing
of public discussion.' Many commentators take middle-ground positions,
generally acknowledging the desirability of some government
communications but also stressing the serious risks they pose to open
public debate.41
Wherever it sits on the spectrum, each view flows from a conception
36. MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 6 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2oo0);
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the very
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least)
innumerable subjects-which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the
government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary."); Abner Greene, Government
of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2000).
38. See generally Greene, supra note 37. See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
39. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 133-72 0993).
40. See infra notes 57-58.
41. See generally David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality
in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992) (arguing for neutrality of certain public-
funded institutions); Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, I999 Wis. L. REV. 119 I (arguing that
distributive justice principles ought to govern subsidized speech issues); Robert C. Post, Subsidized
Speech, so6 YALE L.J. 151 (1996) (asserting that government-subsidized speech may sometimes
compromise citizen independence and thus arguing for a functional approach); Martin H. Redish &
Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 8o MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996) (analyzing
permissibility of government speech subsidies based on the nature of the subsidy); Steven Shiffrin,
Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (198o) (arguing for an "eclectic" approach that balances
the values counseling in favor of restricting speech against the government's legitimate interests in
communicating); YUDOF, supra note 36 (arguing, inter alia, that legislators should be wary of the
problem of indoctrination when deciding what speech to authorize and prohibit and that courts should
consider that problem when making traditional free speech decisions).
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of the impact of government communications. In particular, each view
reflects an understanding of the government's persuasive powers, or,
from another perspective, the ways in which people respond to
government communications. Despite its significance in any analysis of
government communications and their proper place in public debate, this
dynamic has received little attention from courts and commentators.
That is, the existing commentary lacks critical reflection on the ways in
which government communications actually affect the public. Instead,
most approaches tend to assume, without acknowledging, one of three
basic conceptions of the public in its relation to government
communications.
The implicit assumption in contemporary Supreme Court doctrine is
that the public approaches government communications as message-
focused evaluators. That assumption is most evident in the Court's
general confidence that, so long as government does not suppress speech,
democratic mechanisms of political accountability will ensure that
government communications reflect the will of the people.' As the
Supreme Court explained in Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, "When the government speaks, for
instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is,
in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could
espouse some different or contrary position."43 In other words, the
government disseminates its views, and the public, in turn, focuses on the
messages presented, evaluates those messages, and then registers its
agreement or disagreement through the political process. Whatever the
polity decides, the government will reconsider and, if necessary, refine its
future positions to be more in line with the citizenry.'
Sharing an expansive view of the proper role of government
participation in public debate, Abner Greene also tends to assume that
individuals will focus on the messages presented. As long as the
government does not coerce individuals to agree with its position or
monopolize the relevant speech market,45 the government will simply
42. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) (suggesting that the government can say
whatever it likes so long as it is not "suppressing a dangerous idea") (internal quotations omitted).
43. 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2000)
(quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. This approach assumes an effective translation of both the government's position to the
public, and the public's position to the government. It also assumes that electoral choices serve as a
relatively accurate representation of the citizenry's attitudes or beliefs. For a critique of such
assumptions, see, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (199i); see also Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 371-73 (1983).
45. Greene also discusses ventriloquism (which raises similar concerns to transparency) but only
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compete with other speakers to persuade the public to accept its views.46
"The government's favored view will be one among many views worth
supporting," and individuals will decide which views are most worthy.47
While Greene acknowledges that, at times, government speech can
"carry great weight, ' 8 or, in other words, that individuals may be
influenced by factors other than the arguments presented, he nonetheless
expresses confidence that the public will ultimately evaluate messages on
their own terms: "we should consider even quite persuasive government
speech to be just that, quite persuasive."49 In other words, we should
remain quite optimistic about people's abilities to determine whether to
accept the government's views.
By contrast, much of the legal scholarship takes a rather dim view of
people's abilities to evaluate or resist governmental messages. A
recurring conception of the public in relation to unrestrained
government communications is of passive recipients or sponges."
Concerned with the tendency of government to "drown out" other voices
or "skew" or "distort" public debate, numerous scholars warn of the
danger of "thought control" or "indoctrination." Government has the
power to "penetrat[e] ... more and more aspects of modern life" and
thereby "nullify the effectiveness of criticism" and "mold[] thought and
expression in a democratic society."'" Arguing for the need, among other
things, to "distinguish government propaganda and indoctrination
activities from government information, research, education, and
leadership activities,"52 Mark Yudof, for example, cautions that the
government may "dominate[] the minds of individuals, suppressing their
ability to think critically about government leaders and policies." 3
as a factor to be considered in determining whether there has been coercion or monopolization. See
infra text accompanying notes 265-68.
46. Greene, supra note 37, at 34.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45.
49. Id. at 43. At times, Professor Greene appears to retreat from that position. For example,
although he generally argues that there is a clear line between persuasion and coercion (as evidenced
by the actual imposition of sanctions or withdrawal of benefits), see id. at 41-49, he also suggests that
the government's improper invocation of expertise may constitute coercion. See id. at 51-53. To the
extent that he advances the latter view, he appears to support greater restrictions on government
speech than simply warding off coercion (as he narrowly defines that term) and monopolization.
50. See, e.g., YUDOF, supra note 36, at 152, 156; Cole, supra note 41, at 704-08; Robert D.
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1104-06
(1979); Redish & Kessler, supra note 41, at 562-63. Along these lines, Professor Kamenshine has gone
so far as to argue that the First Amendment ought to be interpreted to embody, similar to the express
prohibition against religious establishment, an implied prohibition against political establishment. See
Kamenshine, supra, at i IO4.
5 i. Kamenshine, supra note 5o, at i io4 (quoting Thomas I. Emerson & David Haber, The Scopes
Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 522,522 (i96o)).
52. YUDOF, supra note 36, at i66.
53. Id. at i59. It should be noted that Yudof does look to communications research to examine
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Likewise, David Cole maintains that, through "selective support of
speech," government may "indoctrinate the audience." 4 In other words,
in a regime with insufficient restrictions on the government's ability to
inject its views into the marketplace, individuals may lack the means to
evaluate the government's positions critically, and instead may simply
absorb those positions as their own. The views of the government
become the views of the public."
A related, although less extreme, conception envisions the public as
made up of not passive recipients, but rather vulnerable recipients. As
noted above, many scholars argue that the government should refrain
from embracing a particular vision of the good life, or at least from
taking positions on controversial social issues., 6 Implicit in some of these
accounts is the assumption that, when the government promotes its
conception of the good life, it interferes with people's abilities to make
their own, independent moral calculations. "TAnother assumption is that
the government may exercise special or distinctive persuasive powers, or,
put another way, that a unique impact or harm may result when the
government, as opposed to a private party, embraces a particular value
or idea.f Stephen Gardbaum, for example, argues that "the state is
the process of government persuasion. See id. at 71-89. After finding that that research shows that
governments were sometimes persuasive, and sometimes less so, he nonetheless bases his theory on
the "intuitive appeal" of the idea that governments may manipulate and indoctrinate audiences. See
also Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373, 377 (983).
54- See Cole, supra note 4I, at 704.
55. See generally Schauer, supra note 53 (critiquing this argument). Some might argue that these
scholars fear that the act of drowning out private speakers alone, rather than the fact that the
government is the speaker, will cause indoctrination. While these scholars are undoubtedly concerned
in significant part with the "drowning out" problem, their discussion of the problem suggests that they
fear more generally the government's particular tendency to indoctrinate. Professor Cole, for example,
argues that selective subsidies can "dominate the marketplace or indoctrinate its citizens." Cole, supra
note 41, at 705 (emphasis added). Professor Yudof's distinction between "propaganda and
indoctrination activities" and "information, research, education and leadership activities" suggests that
certain forms of governmental speech may be inherently troublesome. See YUDOF, supra note 36, at
166. Moreover, the authors' prescriptions for limiting speech generally go well beyond simply
prohibiting governmental monopolization of speech markets, and thus suggest that their concern with
indoctrination is based on more than simply the "drowning out" problem. See, e.g., Cole, supra note
41, at 731-47 (arguing for neutrality in certain government-funded institutions); Kamenshine, supra
note 50 (arguing for implied political establishment clause).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
57. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1152 (1989). Some commentators argue the government ought not to promote a
particular vision of the good life not because of fears of the persuasive powers of the government but
because of concerns about the proper role of government qua government in a liberal democracy. See,
e.g., RAwLs, supra note 39, at 133-72.
8. Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 398
(1996); see also Greene, supra note 37, at 44 (canvassing arguments that "government speech may be
improperly persuasive" because "people will grant too much deference to the government"); YUDOF,
supra note 36, at 156 ("There is the danger that the prestige and status of government will give its
utterances an advantage in competition with private-sector communications.").
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special because it cannot purport to act nonauthoritatively. A way of life
that the state endorses and promotes, even through symbolic or
persuasive means, is an 'authorized' way of life."59
As these three conceptions reveal, the existing doctrine and
literature generally have not paid much attention to the ways in which
people actually experience and receive government communications.
They assume that people simply focus on the content of government
messages, or that people generally succumb to them. Since those
assumptions often underlie the normative vision of government
communications proposed by such theories, the assumptions should be
accurate and well-grounded. But as the next Part demonstrates, people
evaluate government messages in more complex ways than are suggested
in the existing doctrine and literature.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO PERSUADE
To understand the significance of government speech and to analyze
its effect on the citizenry, one must first understand more generally how
individuals process persuasive messages and reach judgments on public
affairs. That is, how do citizens evaluate the many, often conflicting,
ideas and arguments about matters of public importance? An extensive
body of literature in the social sciences, particularly in the fields of social
psychology, political science, and communications, provides insight into
the cognitive processes of receiving and analyzing arguments and making
judgments about them. This Part gives a brief overview of the processes
of persuasion.
A. BEYOND MESSAGE CONTENT
Contrary to the unrealistic assumptions underlying the vision of the
message-focused evaluator-and indeed the assumptions underlying
many deliberative models of democracy6-messages derive their
persuasive powers not only from their content and the quality of their
supporting argumentation. As we recognize in our daily lives, individuals
often pay little attention to the substance of arguments, and focus instead
on ultimate conclusions. Individuals process persuasive messages by
taking into account a variety of factors, including source, message,
recipient, and context.6' The degree to which a message, or the beliefs or
59. Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 398.
6o. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 273-337 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981) (discussing the "ideal speech" situation).
61. See generally DANIEL J. O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (I99o); RICHARD M.
PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION (1993); KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION IN PRACTICE
81-113 (I991); Diana M. Mackie & Sarah Queller, The Impact of Group Membership on Persuasion:
Revisiting "Who Says What to Whom With What Effect?," in ATITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL
CoNTExT: THE ROLE AND NoRMs OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP 135 (Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg
eds., 2000).
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attitudes expressed therein, finds acceptance will vary significantly
depending on who delivers the message, who receives it, and the context
in which the communication occurs.
The dominant models of persuasion research describe the processing
used to evaluate messages in terms of two ideal types. 6' The first, which I
shall call argument-based,63 corresponds to the vision of communicative
interchanges espoused by most deliberation theorists. In this view,
individuals pay careful attention to the information and arguments
presented, and expend considerable effort in assessing the merits of the
position advocated. 64 "They actively attempt to comprehend and evaluate
the message's arguments as well as to assess their validity in relation to
the message's conclusion." 6' If listeners find the arguments under scrutiny
strong and convincing, they reconsider their own views and adjust them
to be more in line with the position advocated. 66 If listeners deem the
underlying arguments "weak and specious," then they will reject the
message's conclusion, and in some instances, adopt the opposing view.67
The second ideal type, which I shall refer to as cue-based,6s does not
involve diligent consideration of the merits of an issue. Rather than
absorbing and evaluating a message's content, individuals "may rely on
(typically) more accessible information such as the source's identity oi
other non-content cues in deciding to accept a message's conclusion."
69
Individuals, consciously or unconsciously, adjust their attitudes on an
issue in response to positive or negative cues, or to simple decision rules
62. The two models that dominate current research on persuasion are the elaboration-likelihood
model and the heuristic-systematic model. See James M. Olson & Mark P. Zanna, Attitudes and
Attitude Change, 44 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. I7, 135 (1993); Daan Van Knippenberg, Group Norms,
Prototypicality, and Persuasion, in ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE ROLE AND NORMS
OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP, supra note 61, at 158. Both models differentiate the two modes of message
processing described here. For a detailed comparison of the two models, see A. H. EAGLY & SHELLY
CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 305-50 (1993).
63. The elaboration-likelihood model refers to this type of message processing as central route
processing while the heuristic-systematic model refers to it as systematic processing. See, e.g., Shelly
Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of
Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 46o (1994).
64. See Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 752, 752 (1980); Olson &
Zanna, supra note 62, at 135; Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Effect of Involvement on
Responses to Argument Quantity and Quality: Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion, 46 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 70 (1984) [hereinafter Petty & Cacioppo, Central and Peripheral
Routes].
65. Chaiken, supra note 64, at 752.
66. See Petty & Cacioppo, Central and Peripheral Routes, supra note 64, at 70.
67. Id.
68. The elaboration-likelihood model refers to this type of message processing as peripheral route
processing while the heuristic-systematic model refers to it as heuristic processing. See Chaiken &
Maheswaran, supra note 63, at 460.
69. Chaiken, supra note 64, at 752.
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associated with those cues.7' For example, a person may accept a position
advocated simply because it is presented during a pleasant lunch or by an
expert source.7' That is, the person accepts the advocacy because she
associates the message with good food, or relies on the heuristic that
experts are usually correct. Similarly, a person may reject a position
simply because it represents an unpopular view, or its advocate is an
unattractive or untrustworthy source. In relying on such cues, individuals
may reach judgments on issues "without the need for engaging in any
extensive thought about the arguments presented."72
Although argument-based and cue-based approaches suggest two
distinct ways in which individuals evaluate messages, they are not
mutually exclusive and indeed often occur at the same time. The two
ideal types, in fact, represent opposite ends of a continuum, and, in any
given instance, message processing may correspond with any point along
that continuum.73 Even when individuals focus in detail on the substance
of arguments, they may also be influenced by cues that have nothing to
do with the arguments.74 Such cues may affect listeners' expectations
about the probable validity of persuasive messages and thus bias their
perceptions and evaluations of the arguments contained therein.75 "[I]f a
message is delivered by an expert," for example, "its arguments may be
perceived as stronger and elaborated on more positively than if the
message is delivered by a nonexpert."' 6 The persistence of bias in
argument-based processing renders "persuasion contingent on both the
quality of the message and on a predisposition to respond in a certain
way. ' 77 The likelihood of this biasing effect is greater, moreover, when
argumentation and information are relatively ambiguous and thus more
amenable to different interpretations.78
Argument-based processing will generally lead individuals to reach
judgments that are most consistent with their actual beliefs or
understandings. Yet that does not necessarily make it more socially
desirable or efficient than cue-based processing. The usually unconscious
choice between the two modes of processing is essentially a trade-off
between reliability and economy.79 While the former may be more
70. See Petty & Cacioppo, Central and Peripheral Routes, supra note 64, at 70.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION & PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND
PERIPHERAL ROUTEs TO AlTITUDE CHANGE 7-10 (1986) [hereinafter PETTY & CACIOPPO,
COMMUNICATION].
74. See Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 63, at 461; Van Knippenberg, supra note 62, at 163.
75. Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 63, at 46I.
76. Id.
77. Van Knippenberg, supra note 62, at 163.
78. Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 63, at 461.
79. Chaiken, supra note 64, at 753-54.
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reliable, it also requires the investment of considerably more time and
effort to receive and scrutinize argumentation. 8° While the latter max
prove less reliable, it requires only a minimum of effort and resources.
In light of the barrage of arguments and appeals confronting individuals
on a daily basis, the desirability, and indeed sometimes necessity, of such
economy is considerable. In evaluating messages, individuals apply what
has been called the sufficiency principle: they will use the more resource-
intensive argument-based method only enough to satisfy their reliability
82
concerns.
In a given case, the degree to which reliability or economy matter
turns largely on two factors, motivation and ability.83 With regard to
motivation, when individuals believe it is important to construct a highly
accurate judgment, reliability concerns take precedence."' That is, when
individuals receive messages on topics perceived to be personally
relevant, or when they believe that their evaluations and opinions on an
issue presented will have important consequences for themselves or
others, they are more likely to engage in detailed and deliberate
consideration of message content.85 In contrast, when individuals
encounter arguments on topics perceived to be unimportant, or when
they believe that their responses will be inconsequential, they may be less
willing to exert more than a minimum of effort and resources in reaching
judgments on those topics.86
Yet even if individuals are highly motivated, economy concerns may
nonetheless dominate because of limitations on ability. Individuals will
vary in terms of the resources that they may call forth, or rely on, in
evaluating a message. For example, some individuals may .lack the
cognitive sophistication to analyze particularly complex messages in a
rigorous fashion."' Also, time constraints or distractions may prevent
individuals from focusing and critically and systematically evaluating the
arguments presented.S8 Absent the ability to engage in heightened
cognitive work, individuals are more likely to defer to external cues or
simple decision rules in reaching judgments.
In short, the social science literature confirms, contrary to the
8o. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Durairaj Maheswaran & Shelly Chaiken, Promoting Systematic Processing in Low-
Motivation Settings: Effect of Incongruent Information on Processing and Judgment, 6i J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 13, 14 (991).
83. See Chaiken, supra note 64, at 754; Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 63, at 460; Petty &
Cacioppo, Central and Peripheral Routes, supra note 64, at 71.
84. Chaiken, supra note 64, at 754.
85. Id.; Petty & Cacioppo, Central and Peripheral Routes, supra note 64, at 71.
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assumptions underlying much legal writing and deliberation theory, that
people do not uniformly respond to communications as message-focused
evaluators. Whether people accept messages, including those advanced
by the government, maz have as much to do with external cues as with
the messages' content. This is especially so for complex messages, or
messages that people perceive to have less immediate relevance to their
daily lives. Thus, the extent to which some messages, including
governmental messages, gain public approval may ultimately have little
to do with people's assessments of the ideas and arguments presented.
B. THE GOVERNMENT CUE
Persuasion research also undermines the common assumption that
individuals are passive or vulnerable recipients of government
communications. Such research reveals that listeners do not accept
messages more readily because the government disseminates them.
Rather, government authorship functions as a source cue, the
significance of which varies from context to context. Although there are
numerous characteristics of a source, for example, likability, similarity,
and attractiveness, that may affect its persuasiveness, I focus on
credibility because it usually is the most significant factor and, unlike the
other characteristics, applies more generally to institutions as well as
individuals.'
Credibility refers to "the judgments made by a perceiver (e.g., a
message recipient) concerning the believability of a communicator."'"
Though multiple factors inform those judgments, the speaker's perceived
competence and trustworthiness consistently emerge as the primary
elements.92 Listeners assess a speaker's competence by focusing on how
the communicator knows what she is discussing. That assessment turns
on whether they see her as having the requisite intelligence, experience,
or sensitivity to determine the truth or correctness of a matter.93 An
evaluation of trustworthiness examines why a communicator takes the
position that she does. It depends on "perceptions of the source's
89. The phenomenon of cue-based processing has been confirmed not only at the individual level,
but at the aggregate level as well. See Jeffrey J. Mondak, Source Cues and Policy Approval: The
Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support for the Reagan Agenda, 37 AM. J. POL. ScI. 186, 205 (1993).
9o. See PERLOFF, supra note 6I, at 136-53.
91. O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 130-31.
92. See id. at 132, 14i; Brian Sternthal, Lynn W. Phillips & Ruby Dholakia, The Persuasive Effect
of Source Credibility: A Situational Analysis, 42 PUB. OPINION Q. 285, 286-87 (1978).
93. See Gary Cronkhite & Jo R. Liska, The Judgment of Communicant Acceptability, in
PERSUASION: NEw DiREcnONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 126-27 (Michael E. Roloff & Gerald R.
Miller eds., 198o). Common research scales used to identify competence (also referred to as expertise,
authoritativeness, or qualification) include "experienced-inexperienced, informed-uninformed,
trained-untrained, qualified-unqualified, skilled-unskilled, intelligent-unintelligent, and expert-not
expert." O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 132.
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intention" or "attributions of the communicant's behavior."94
Perceived shortcomings in competence or trustworthiness can
diminish a source's credibility. Even if audiences see a communicator as
having the proper expertise to understand and report on a matter, if they
believe that "the pressures of a situation have compromised a
communicator's willingness to be open and honest,"95 then they will find
her lacking in credibility.96 Likewise, even if audiences perceive a speaker
to be honest, acting with the best of intentions, if they do not believe he
has the requisite knowledge and experience to analyze an issue, they will
not find him credible.7 Litigators apparently understand the impact of
perceived shortcomings in these areas, for when they impeach witnesses,
they focus on precisely these points: "possible self-interest and bias on
the part of the witness," and "the witness's incompetence to testify about
issues. ' 98
In analyzing the government's credibility as a speaker, it is important
to remember that the "government" is not a monolithic entity. It consists
of a variety of entities and individuals. The credibility of those myriad
units is not uniform but varied. Thus, when we refer to the credibility of
the "government," we could be referring to the credibility of a particular
individual, like a city councilman or the Food and Drug Administration
Commissioner, or of an entity, like a police department or the military.99
Public perceptions of these individuals and institutions, both in terms of
their competence and trustworthiness, vary significantly. What has been
referred to as the "paradox of distance" with respect to public
perceptions of government markedly illustrates that point."0 Studies have
found that while the public tends to trust and respect the specific
government agencies or employees with which they have had personal
dealings or encounters, they tend to distrust and disparage the
government and its employees in the abstract.' As such perceptions
inform credibility determinations, it thus appears that while some parts
of government may be viewed as highly credible, others may be
94. PERLOFF, supra note 6I, at 143. Common research scales used to ascertain trustworthiness
(also called character, safety, or personal integrity) include "honest-dishonest, trustworthy-
untrustworthy, open-minded-closed-minded, just-unjust, fair-unfair, and unselfish-selfish." O'KEEFE,
supra note 61, at 132.
95. O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at I44.
96. This is sometimes referred to as a reporting bias. See O'KEEFE, supra note 6I, at 133, 137-38;
PERLOFF, supra note 61, at 143.
97. This is sometimes referred to as knowledge bias. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 133, 137.
98. G.R. Miller & J.K. Burgoon, Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 170 (N.L. Kerr & R.M. Bray eds., 1982).
99. Also, the government communicates in a variety of ways, and not always through official
government organs. This issue is discussed supra in Part III.
Ioo. H. George Frederickson & David G. Frederickson, Public Perceptions of Ethics in
Government, 537 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 163, 165--67 (1995).
ioi. Id.
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perceived as less so. Thus, listeners may find the "government" more
credible when it speaks through individuals with whom listeners have
personal experience, and less credible when it speaks through
pronouncements from a distant, faceless bureaucracy.
Even with respect to any specific government agency or official,
moreover, credibility is not constant. As credibility is not an intrinsic
property of a communicator, but rather a function of the ways in which
the communicator is perceived, the credibility of any speaker varies
significantly from context to context. This situational variation in
credibility appears when the government speaks. For example, in a study
of community responses to risk contamination assessments provided by
government officials, researchers found that the extent to which
communities accepted, or were persuaded by, the officials' assessments
turned in large part on the conditions that gave rise to the
communication. I2 In communities where government officials discovered
contamination in the process of routine testing and "where residents
themselves had no reason to suspect a problem, public reaction to the
announcement of the chemical contamination and information on
possible health risks was... calm.""'1 By contrast, "[i]n communities
where residents themselves first suspected a problem and had to call it to
the attention of officials, the risk information subsequently given to them
by the officials was perceived as an understatement of the real dangers or
even a 'whitewash.""'  Accordingly, contrary to notions implicit in
government communications theories assuming passive or vulnerable
recipients, the government is not necessarily distinctly persuasive, but
may sometimes be distinctly unpersuasive.
The relationship between the position advocated and the
communicator's perceived interest in that position will also significantly
affect credibility. Not surprisingly, advocating positions against one's
self-interest enhances one's credibility. This is especially true for low
credibility speakers.' 6 Researchers have found, for example, that a high-
credibility prosecutor, who, consistent with his best interests, argued in
favor of expanding prosecutorial powers, was much more persuasive than
a low-credibility convicted criminal, who, consistent with his best
interests, argued for restricting court power.'" When the prosecutor and
criminal changed their positions and advocated positions against their
102. See June Fessenden-Raden et al., Providing Risk Information in Communities: Factors
Influencing What is Heard and Accepted, 12 Sc, TECH. & HUM. VALUES 94,94-95 (1987).
103. Id. at 95.
io4. Id.
lo5. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 136-37.
io6. See Elaine Walster et al., On Increasing the Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator, 2
J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 325, 325-42 (1966).
107. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
self-interest, however, they were almost equally persuasive. "8 While both
were more persuasive when arguing against their perceived interests, the
increase in the criminal's credibility was far more substantial." Even
when the government is perceived to be highly credible on an issue,
therefore, it may not necessarily be highly persuasive. When a
government speaker advocates a position that advances the
government's interests, listeners may find her less convincing than a non-
governmental speaker who espouses the same position, particularly if
that speaker's interests appear to be in conflict with the government's.
Sometimes credibility and persuasion are inversely related."'
Communicators generally benefit from high credibility when they
advocate counter-attitudinal positions, or views that are contrary to, or in
tension with, the views previously held by audiences."' Individuals
appear more open and willing to question and reconsider their own views
if a highly competent and trustworthy speaker takes an opposing stand.
Yet the impact of high credibility diminishes when speakers assert pro-
attitudinal positions, or those in line with the audience's positions."2
Indeed, low-credibility communicators sometimes prove more persuasive
than high-credibility ones in reinforcing audience's previously held
views." ' One explanation for this phenomenon is that someone listening
to a low-credibility speaker may be "more inclined to 'help out' the
communicator in defending their common viewpoint, and hence...
might be led to think more extensively about supporting arguments......
Thus, if the government is highly credible on an issue and is trying to
maintain and reinforce views already held by audiences, it may not be
particularly persuasive.
In short, the social science research shows that it is a mistake to
assume either that listeners focus primarily on the content of government
communications, or that they tend to accept or defer to such
communications. Rather, as this Part has illustrated, the ways in which
people process and respond to all messages, including those emanating
from the government, turn on a complex interplay of a variety of factors,
including message, speaker, recipient, and context; none of those factors
alone is necessarily controlling. Thus we ought to question seriously any
theory of the proper role of government communications in public
debate premised on the idea that listeners primarily evaluate
io8. Id.
io9. Id.; see also O'KEEFE, supra note 6r, at z37.
iio. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 142-43.
iii. See id.
112. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 142-43; Sternthal, Phillips & Dholaki, supra note 92, at 290-91.
113. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 142-43.
114. Id. at 143. Sometimes, in other words, when speakers advocate counter-attitudinal positions,
source credibility functions as a cue to stimulate, rather than replace, argument-based processing.
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governmental messages on the basis of their content. Similarly, we
should be skeptical of any approach that assumes that active
governmental participation in the marketplace of ideas is likely to
indoctrinate or otherwise overpower listeners. A properly nuanced
theory of government communications must instead take into account
the complexity of the ways in which listeners evaluate governmental
communications. Part III begins this task."5
III. TRANSPARENCY AND GOVERNMENT PERSUASION
To develop an account of the role of government communications in
public debate, and the proper limits, if any, on that role, it is necessary to
understand how listeners actually receive or experience such
communications. Although many important factors affect that process, I
focus on transparency, a factor that the existing commentary on
government communications has largely neglected."6 By "transparency,"
I refer to the extent to which recipients understand the government to
bear responsibility for a message. This Part argues that developments in
technology and society are making transparency in government
communications increasingly elusive, while the importance of
transparency in ensuring accountability and responsiveness remains
undiminished. In explaining why government communications should be
transparent, this Part relies not simply on general political theory, but
also on relevant social science research illustrating some of the likely
effects of non-transparent government communications.
A. TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS
When a government speaks, it is often reasonably clear to the
listener that the government bears responsibility for the message. For
example, when a government official delivers a speech in his official
capacity, members of the audience will generally understand the
government (or its representative) to be speaking. Similarly, when signs
on government buildings proclaim the virtues of justice and equality, a
passerby generally understands such proclamations to be the
government's. Even when the government communicates without using
its officials or property, well-established practices or common usages
often make clear that the speaker is the government. An observer of a
115. It is noteworthy that my reliance on social science research may serve as a cue for, or may
bias, some readers when they evaluate the theory of government communications developed here. In
particular, I refer to the fact that the "expertise of social science" cue may influence, either positively
or negatively, some readers.
t6. But see Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 5377, 1491-95 (2oo); Greene, supra note 37, at 49-52; Elena Kagan, The Changing
Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-
Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 29, 55- I discuss Greene's perspective later. See infra Part
V.B.i.
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billboard advertisement seeking recruits for the United States Army, for
instance, reasonably would perceive the federal government, rather than
the owner of the billboard or the advertising agency that created the
image, to be speaking.
But a government also speaks in ways that do not reveal its identity.
With such "non-transparent" communications, listeners may not perceive
that the government bears responsibility for the speech. That lack of
clarity arises either because it is difficult to ascertain who is speaking at
all (as in the case of anonymous speech), or because an entity other than
the government appears to be speaking (as in the case of pseudonymous
speech). In the latter context, the audience may not realize that the entity
has any affiliation with the government, and therefore assumes that the
entity is speaking for itself, not at the government's behest.
Alternatively, the audience may understand that the entity is a part of
the government, or receives public support, but may nevertheless assume
that the entity speaks of its own accord and on its own account, at least
with respect to some universe of matters. For example, students at a state
university know that their professors are paid by the government, but
nevertheless may perceive the professors' scholarly writings and
classroom lectures to represent their own views, independent of
government influence.
Transformations in social and political life suggest that the presence
or absence of transparency is likely to have increasing significance with
respect to government communications. First, new communications and
media technologies make it far easier for anyone, including a
government speaker, to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously.
The internet, for example, has facilitated a burgeoning of expression
among people who have little knowledge about one another. In online
chat groups or bulletin boards, people can engage in ongoing
conversations, transcending time and space. Where the absence of face-
to-face interaction is the norm-or, more to the point, where anonymity,
or pseudonymity, is a default condition of communication, rather than a
condition to be actively achieved or maintained" 7 -speakers have
increased opportunities (at least vis- -vis the general internet
participant) to mask their identities or to create new ones."
Other technological innovations make possible another form of
anonymity, one that can hide the actual extent of authorship. Digital
117. See Gia B. Lee, Addressing Anonymous Messages in Cyberspace, 2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED
COMMUNICATION (1996), at http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issuei/anon.html.
118. See generally Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (20o0). Much attention has also
been given to the fact of increased potential for surveillance on the Internet, and the fact that people
may assume that they are interacting anonymously or pseudonymously when in fact they are not. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 30-62 (i999); Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1242-43 (1998).
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technologies now allow the creation or alteration of voices and images in
a manner that makes the resulting product seem "natural" or "real.""' 9
As a result of such seamless alterations, recipients assume that an image
or recording represents "truth" or "reality," rather than the creator's
fictional construction or re-construction of events. 2 ' Digital technologies,
therefore, allow a heightened form of anonymity: one has the capacity to
communicate one's views without others even knowing that one is
communicating."'
Second, the ongoing blurring of the distinctions between the public
and the private heightens the potential that a government's control of, or
responsibility for, the dissemination of its favored views will go
unnoticed. Today, governments are increasingly relying on and
establishing partnerships with the private sector to perform traditional
governmental functions, such as the operation of schools2. or prisons,' 3
and to provide a wide range of other types of services, such as managing
the national waitlist for organ donation"4 or administering state welfare
programs.' 5 Included as part of such sought-after services is the
dissemination of the government's favored views.",6 The government
119. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002) (describing digital
technologies used to create virtual child pornography).
120. Of course, every image or recording represents a particular view of the truth. My point here is
to note the increasing ease with which one can now use technology to expand even further one's
creation or re-creation of events.
121. Such technologies make event reconstructions, like the one described by Milan Kundera in his
novel The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, much easier to achieve. According to Kundera, Vladimir
Clementis, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Czechoslovakia in the early days of the Communist regime,
was hanged in 1952 on trumped up charges of treason. The authorities immediately airbrushed
Clementis' image out of a famous photo that showed him standing next to the Communist leader
Klement Gottwald during a triumphal party rally in 1948. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER
AND FORGETTING 3 (Michael Henry Heim trans., Alfred A. Knopf i98O). It may be that increasing
public awareness of these technologies will alter intuitive assumptions about whether an identifiable
person is communicating.
122. See Dale Mezzacappa, After to Years, Edison Schools Still Struggling to Prove Itself,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. sO, 2002, at C2 (describing private for-profit company managing about
120 public schools).
123. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1392-94 (20o3).
124. The federal government contracts with the United Network for Organ Sharing, a private non-
profit organization, to provide this service. See http://www.unos.org.
125. See Metzger, supra note 123, at 1385-86. For further examples of governmental reliance on, or
partnership with, private entities, see Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155,
176-89 (200O); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 592-664
(2000); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 386-
95 (998).
126. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (permitting government subisdies on the
condition that doctors and counselors provide family planning counseling without discussing abortion);
Stephen J. Hedges, U.S. Pays PR Guru to Make Its Points, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2002, at C1 (describing
a public-relations firm that "shapes and relays" messages for federal government); Kurtz & Waxman,
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secures the private sector's assistance through, for example, contracting,
using vouchers and tax credits, or promoting public/private partnerships.
As the government enlists a wide array of traditionally non-
governmental bodies to assist it in spreading its views, it becomes
increasingly difficult for listeners to understand who bears responsibility
for a message, and in particular whether the government does so.
The federal government's recent efforts to combat terrorism provide
a vivid example of the ways that these two trends -technological
innovation and the blurring of the public/private distinction -may reduce
transparency in government communications. Soon after the September
ii attacks, it was widely reported that the federal government was
preparing to create a new office within the Pentagon, the Office of
Strategic Influence, to spread pro-American messages to civilians
abroad, both in friendly and unfriendly countries.'27 Although the office
would have used e-mail, among other means, to spread its messages, one
government official said that the e-mail likely would not identify the
government as the sender: "the return address will probably be a dot-
com, not a dot-mil [the military's Internet designation]." 8 There were
also reports that the office would send deliberately false messages to the
foreign press. In response to a barrage of criticism, one high-ranking
official stressed that no federal officials would lie, but "he declined to
rule out the possibility that that Pentagon might give outside contractors
the authority to disseminate false or misleading information to foreign
news agencies.' ' .9 The federal government ultimately announced that it
was abandoning plans for the office. 3
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-TRANSPARENCY
When a government communicates in a non-transparent fashion, the
consequences are manifold. Most obviously, it interferes with people's
supra note I, at AI (noting that television networks promote anti-drug messages).
127. See, e.g., Bryan Bender, U.S. "Disinformation" Proposal Under Fire, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 2002,
at N6; James Dao & Eric Schmitt, A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds; Pentagon Readies Efforts
to Sway Sentiment Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at AI; Vernon Loeb & Dana Milbank, New
Defense Office Won't Mislead, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2002, at A15. While the federal
government's anti-terrorism efforts were intended to target the foreign press, there is little question
that, in an era of increasing globalization, the messages sent abroad would resurface in domestic
contexts. Indeed, in the I98OS, it was a Lebanese newspaper that broke the Iran Contra story. See
Lynda Gytdon Taylor, Plan to Mislead Foreign Press Would Have Caused Damage, Prrr. POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 2002, at W3 .
128. See Dao & Schmitt, supra note 127, at Ai.
129. James Dao, A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds; New Agency Will Not Lie, Top Pentagon
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at A14.
130. There have been some suggestions that only the office's planned name was dropped while the
planned programs were nonetheless carried out. See, e.g., Press Release, Fairness & Accuracy in
Reporting, Media Advisory: The Office of Strategic Influence is Gone, But Are Its Programs in
Place?, at http://www.fair.org/press-releases/osi-followup.html (Nov. 27, 2002).
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ability to determine what a government is saying. When people receive a
particular message, they may not attribute it to the government. Also,
when people consider the universe of messages, they misperceive which
ones were spread by the government. Even if people know a great deal
about the views or positions taken by a government, moreover, they may
not know the extent to which the government has undertaken means to
persuade or influence them or others to adopt those views or positions. If
the government communicates non-transparently, people may not know
how, when, and where the government is disseminating its views.
Beyond impairing people's ability to identify the government's
dissemination of messages, non-transparent communications may also
mislead people about the views of other, non-governmental parties.
When speakers advocate the government's views without making clear
that they speak for the government, audiences may incorrectly attribute
the speech to that identifiable speaker rather than to the government.
This misperception may result even if neither the government nor the
identifiable speaker intends to mislead. 3'
Non-transparent communications are worthy of attention and
concern not only because they make it more difficult to determine who is
saying what. Equally important, this form of communication may actually
enhance the government's persuasive powers. By masking its identity as
speaker, the government (or in fact any speaker) can use a variety of
cues that ultimately increase its persuasiveness.'32 Such heightened
persuasive powers result not from a straightforward appeal to people's
thoughts or values on the subjects under discussion-from recipients'
argument-based processing-but instead from the operation of cues that
may have little to do with the content of the communication-from cue-
based processing. Three cues are particularly relevant in the context of
non-transparent communications.
The first cue is source credibility. As discussed above,'33 contrary to
widely held assumptions, the government is not always highly credible. A
government's many "speakers" have varying degrees of credibility, and
the credibility of each may change from context to context. For these
reasons, and also because a speaker's credibility does not always make
him or her more persuasive, government speakers, like other speakers,
may sometimes have strong incentives to rely on, or appropriate, the
credibility of others.
Where the government and its identifiable representatives have low
131. Sometimes the private speaker may fully agree with the message. The speaker's failure to
identify her role in spreading the government's views nonetheless has adverse consequences for
political accountability. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51.
132. Concealing its identity as speaker may also, of course, serve to decrease the government's
persuasive powers. See infra text accompanying note 232.
133. See supra Part II.B.
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or moderate credibility on a particular topic, the government may wish to
speak under the guise of another speaker with greater credibility. For
example, in matters of personal medical and health-related advice,
patients may sometimes be unlikely to find advice from a centralized
bureaucracy to be especially credible or persuasive. Such listeners may
be more likely to credit personalized advice from their own physicians or
health care providers.'34 In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court held that doctors'
advice to patients on family planning matters was simply that of service
providers in a federally funded program.'35 Yet, to the extent that the
patients understood doctors to be speaking, the persuasiveness of the
government's message was likely to be heightened by the patients'
perceptions of the doctors' expertise and trustworthiness, and their
corresponding tendency or willingness to defer to the doctors' judgment.
When the government is highly credible on an issue, it may choose
to communicate openly, without masking its identity as speaker.'36 Yet,
even when its credibility is high, it may nonetheless seek to enlist the
services of low-credibility speakers. The study discussed above
concerning the persuasiveness of prosecutors and defendants provides a
relevant example.'37 That study revealed that although prosecutors
generally were very credible and persuasive, low-credibility defendants
could also be quite persuasive, particularly when advocating views
ostensibly against their own interests, in line with those of the
government.' Thus, when seeking support for positions that are
perceived to be in its own interest (e.g., greater prosecutorial power), the
government may be more successful in persuading the public to adopt its
views if it can enlist others, including low-credibility speakers whose
interests are perceived to be in conflict with the government, to speak
out in favor of the government's position.
The second cue with particular significance in the context of non-
transparent communications is popularity. The phenomenon of popular
influence is well-established in the social science literature, which shows
that ideas perceived to have achieved broad acceptance are generally
more persuasive. In his pioneering studies involving group research,
Muzafer Sherif found powerful evidence of the tendency toward social
conformity.'39 Participants were asked to report the distance moved by a
134. In some cases, the opposite may be true. For example, individuals may sometimes be more
receptive to medical and health-related advice from government agencies such as the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention or the local health department, than from their own personal doctors.
135. 500 U.S. 173, 193, 200 (1991).
136. Of course, legal or political considerations, wholly distinct from issues of believability, may
also influence the government's decision to reveal or conceal its identity as speaker.
137. See supra text accompanying notes IO7-O9.
138. See id.
139. See Mackie & Queller, supra note 61, at 137 (citing MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SOCIAL NORMS (Harper & Brothers 1936)).
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small speck of light, which was stationary but appeared to move because
of a perceptual illusion." Unlike the responses of those tested
individually, the responses of those tested in the presence of others
tended to converge.'4 ' This uniformity of responses persisted even after
the participants were separated and tested in isolation again.'42
In another set of classic studies, Solomon Asch presented subjects
with lines of varying lengths and asked them to identify which line was
the same length as a target line.'43 Subjects questioned alone identified
the correct line in 99% of the trials, but those questioned in the company
of others, who, unknown to the subject, were instructed by Asch to give
the identical incorrect response, went along with the others' incorrect
responses in approximately 33% of the trials.'" Asch's study
demonstrated that the consensus opinion of others can exert an influence
so powerful that individuals may revise even what they observe to be
true in the physical environment. While Sherif's and Asch's studies
focused on the influence of others in close proximity, or in the same
reference group, other studies have confirmed similar findings in
contexts beyond those of small groups.'45 Taken together, these studies
reveal that a position perceived to be accepted or popular is likely to
have greater influence.
Individuals tend to adopt views perceived to be popular or
widespread for three types of reasons.4 First, especially when lacking
information on a particular matter, individuals see popular views as
providing information as to what is correct or true.'47 Ambiguous or
complex social situations tend to enhance that effect.' 48 Second,
individuals associate popular views with reward from others, such as
social acceptance or material benefits.'49 Even if individuals do not
necessarily personally agree with a position, they may at least publicly




143. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE
SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995).
44. See id. at I6.
145. See, e.g., Diana C. Mutz, Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion
on Political Attitudes, 14 POL. BEHAV. 89, 90-91 (1992) (citing studies).
146. See Sara M. Baker & Richard E. Petty, Majority & Minority Influence: Source-Position
Imbalance as a Determinant of Message Scrutiny, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1994).
147. See id. at 5 (citing L. Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 Hum. REL. 117-
40(1954)).
148. See id. (citing M. Deutsch & H.B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social
Influences upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 629-36 (1955)).
149. See id.
i5o. See id. (citing S. Moscovici, Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior, in 13 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 209-39 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., i98o); G. MUGNY & J. PEREZ, THE
foil
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individuals espouse popular views for purposes of identification.'5 ' Being
in sync with the majority, for example, can enhance feelings of power and
self-esteem.
By participating in public debate, the government makes its favored
ideas or viewpoints more popular or widespread. It accomplishes this not
simply by advocating views on its own, but also by using subsidies and
other incentives to enlist or encourage others to communicate ideas that
they might not otherwise have expressed.' 2 Because individuals who
convey the government's ideas are not necessarily taking positions with
which they disagree (although some might), such practices do not
infringe on the speaker's autonomy. Even though individuals are free to
decide whether to communicate the views of the government, however,
the fact remains that the government's allocation of resources in support
of a view makes it far more likely that individuals will more frequently
and widely express that view.'53 And as that idea becomes more accepted,
the popularity cue may generate even more adherents.'54 Furthermore,
by participating in public debate in this way, the government may stifle
the expression of some ideas that would otherwise have been aired.'55
These ideas disappear from debate not as a result of any direct
suppression by the government, but because of the additional incentives
to produce one idea rather than the other., 6 This silencing effect will
likely have a greater impact on ideas or positions about which people do
not have strong feelings.
When the government communicates in a transparent fashion, the
public understands when and how the government is injecting its views
into public debate, and thus perceives the government's role in making
certain positions popular. ' By communicating in a non-transparent
manner, however, the government can make its favored positions appear
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MINORITY INFLUENCE (1991)).
151. See id. (citing G. MUGNY & J. PEREZ, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MINORITY INFLUENCE (1991);
H.C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 51-60 (1958); J.M. Levine & C.J. Ranelli, Majority Reactions to Shifting and Stable
Attitudinal Deviates, 8 EUR. J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 55-70 (1978)).
152. See generally Redish & Kessler, supra note 41 (discussing impact of various types of
subsidies).
153. See id.
154. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 81-84 (discussing cascade effects of social influence).
155. See Redish & Kessler, supra note 41, at 554 (discussing impact of various types of subsidies).
156. See id.
157. There may be another type of transparency problem even when individuals understand the
government's responsibility for a message. The government may speak at the behest of private interest
groups or their lobbyists, and the public may be unaware of that connection or relationship. This
possibility raises serious concerns, especially in contexts in which citizens may be more apt to assume
that the government is trustworthy (e.g., in issuing appropriate safety guidelines). Yet, insofar as
members of the public find the government's messages objectionable or unacceptable, citizens may
hold the government accountable for the messages.
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more popular than they really are. Non-transparent communications
leave the public unaware of the government's role in shaping public
debate, and thereby create the misleading impression that the relevant
realm of public debate is unaffected by government participation. By
masking its responsibility for a particular position, therefore, the
government can exploit the popularity cue to its advantage while
avoiding any potential costs associated with openly taking that position.
This criticism-or caution-about government participation in
public debate is distinct from the concern, expressed frequently in the
relevant literature, that government speech may threaten democracy by
skewing public debate."58 Those arguments tend to assume that
government communications threaten to dominate or reshape public
debate.I"9 By contrast, this cue-based concern focuses on the harm that
results when non-transparent government communications make an idea
seem more popular or accepted than it really is. In other words, the
concern here is not simply with government efforts to overwhelm debate
or to affect private speakers' choices about what views to express (or not
to express), but instead with governmental efforts to skew perceptions of
public debate.
The third cue, multiple sources, is related to the popularity cue, but
distinct from it. By multiple sources, I refer not to the number of
individuals who deliver a message, but to the number of social entities
that bear responsibility for a message. "A social entity is defined as an
individual or group of persons who are perceived to be a unit, distinct
from others present. "'6' Thus, while ten individuals might be considered
ten distinct entities, to the extent that any are perceived as non-
independent and acting in coordination with one another, those same ten
individuals might be understood to constitute a fewer number of social
entities. Multiple source influence describes the observed phenomenon
that if a message is perceived to have the support of more social entities,
greater persuasion will likely result. 6' Evidence supports this conclusion




A study by Stephen Harkins and Richard Petty illustrates this point.
College students received three strong arguments in favor of senior
158. See YUDOF, supra note 36, at 145-207; Cole, supra note 41, at 705; Redish & Kessler, supra
note 41, at 554.
159. See YUDOF, supra note 36, at 145-207; Cole, supra note 41, at 705; Redish & Kessler, supra
note 41, at 554.
16o. D. Wilder, Perception of Groups, Size of Opposition, and Social Influence, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 253, 254 (977).
t61. See id.; PETTY & CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION, supra note 73, at 96-IoI; Stephen G. Harkins &
Richard E. Petty, Social Context Effects in Persuasion: The Effects of Multiple Sources and Multiple
Targets, in BASIC GROUP PROCESSES 149, 163-70 (Paul B. Paulus ed., 1983).
162. See Harkins & Petty, supra note i61, 163-7o.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
comprehensive exams. 6' The arguments were presented in one of three
ways: by one speaker; by three independent speakers, each of whom
presented one argument; or by three speakers, each giving one argument,
who were presented as belonging to a committee that had worked
together in generating their arguments.'6 4 The study found that the three
independent speakers proved more persuasive than either the single
speaker or the three speakers made to appear non-independent, and that
the non-independent three speakers were no more persuasive than the
single speaker.' 6' Consistent with the phenomenon of multiple source
influence, the fact that there were three speakers rather than one
advocating a message proved significant only when listeners perceived
the speaker to constitute three distinct social entities.
One account explains multiple source influence by focusing on the
differences in credibility assigned to several entities as compared to a
single entity, and to individuals acting as parts of social entities as
opposed to individuals acting on their own.I66 Listeners assume that
members of the same social entity are more likely to be influenced by
one another than will members of different social entities. Listeners may
surmise, for example, that members of the same social group share a
view on a matter simply in the interest of reaching an agreement or as a
result of the same, sometimes flawed, reasoning. When members of
different social groups hold the same view, however, message recipients
are more likely to conclude that that view was the result of deliberate,
independent analysis.i 67 In other words, the shared views of independent
entities are more informative and credible-i.e., there is "more reason"
to adopt those views-than the same views espoused by members of a
single entity.
A related explanation also emphasizes the tendency of individuals to
infer that information from several independent entities is likely to be
based on different perspectives or independent pools of knowledge.168
That account, however, maintains that such inferences lead individuals
not simply to accept without scrutiny the views held by multiple sources,
but instead to pay more attention to the arguments presented. "If
arguments from multiple sources are perceived as representing
independent perspectives on an issue, then this information may be more
worthy of diligent consideration than information from only one
perspective. ' ' 66 This hypothesis of an increased motivation to put effort
63. See PErrY & CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION, supra note 73, at oo.
64. Id.
165. Id.
66. Id. at 97-98 (discussing views of others).
167. See id.
168. See id. at ioo.
169. Id.
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into message processing finds support in evidence indicating that
multiple sources, as compared to a single source, not only prove more
persuasive when presenting cogent arguments but also prove less
persuasive, or generate more unfavorable thoughts, when presenting
specious arguments.'
Regardless of which explanation is more accurate, and indeed it may
well be that both mechanisms are at work, the appearance of uniformity
or variety among speakers will likely affect speaker persuasiveness. This
phenomenon is particularly relevant to the issue of government
communications because it reveals how transparency can affect the
government's persuasiveness. If listeners are unaware that speakers are
all communicating the government's message, the government may foster
the impression that a composite of separate and independent entities,
rather than interrelated ones, are all advancing the same position. In
other words, the lack of transparency may lead message recipients to
misperceive the relations among speakers and may thus enhance the
government's effectiveness, insofar as it is presenting relatively cogent
arguments, in inducing persuasion.
Thus, the lack of transparency in government communications can
have significant implications for public debate. First, people will not be
able to identify what the government is saying and how it is doing so.
Second, people may incorrectly attribute to specific individuals messages
that they may not hold. Third, and relatedly, the government can
heighten its persuasiveness by making use of source cues. By masking its
responsibility for speech, the government can lead people to believe that
high-credibility or otherwise particularly persuasive speakers hold a
certain view, or that more people, making wholly independent decisions,
share that view. Although these three conditions may equally result
when private parties communicate non-transparently, a different set of
concerns apply to government communications. The next Part addresses
those concerns.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF THE TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE
Part III introduced the concept of transparency in government
communications and discussed how the absence of transparency may
affect both the polity's ability to determine what views the government is
disseminating and the government's ability to persuade. This Part
explains why the principle that governments should communicate
transparently has a constitutional dimension. First, it argues that the
constitutional commitment to political accountability calls for
transparency in government communications. Then, acknowledging the
First Amendment rights of private speakers to speak anonymously or
170. See id.; Harkins & Petty, supra note I6I, at 169.
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pseudonymously, it explains why the rationale for protecting private
speech does not extend to government speech.
A. GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The commitment to political accountability stands as a bedrock
principle of our Constitution. It is reflected throughout the Constitution's
text including, most obviously, the numerous provisions setting forth the
requirements for regular federal elections, 7' the multiple amendments
expanding the nationwide franchise,'72 and the Seventeenth Amendment
providing for the direct election of Senators.'73 In establishing a
representative democracy, those provisions reflect the basic concept that
government officials shall be directly responsible to the citizenry.
The First Amendment Speech Clause also embodies, in significant
part, this commitment to political accountability.'74 As the Supreme
Court has stated, "'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means... is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system." '75 By protecting
public debate and in some instances mandating a right of access to
government proceedings,' the First Amendment allows open discussion
and criticism of governmental policies and practices and thereby creates
the conditions enabling an informed and critical electorate. In other
words, coupled with the right to vote, the First Amendment provides a
means by which the citizenry can "check" and ultimately direct
governmental power.'77
The Accounting Clause, which provides that "a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time, is another example of the
commitment to political accountability. In requiring such publication, the
Clause enables the public to learn of the federal government's uses of the
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. i (popular election of Members of the House of Representatives
every two years); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (election of one-third of the Senators every two years); id. art. II,
§ i, cl. i (elections of President and Vice President every four years).
172. See id. amend. XV, § i (race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XIX, § I
(sex); id. amend. XXIV, § i (failure to pay any poll tax or other tax); id. amend. XXVI, § i (age, for
citizens who are eighteen years of age or older).
173. See id. amend. XVII.
174. See id. amend. i.
175. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359,369 (931)).
176. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. i, 13 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-1O (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 6o7-Io
(1982).
177. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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public fisc and to hold the government answerable for those uses through
the electoral process.'79 The history of the Clause saggests that at least
some of the Framers espoused that intention. George Mason, who
initially moved to include an accounting requirement at the Federal
Convention,' later explained during the Virginia debates that "[t]he
people.., had a right to know the expenditures of their money."''
Similarly, James McHenry stated during the Maryland debates, "[tlhe
People who give their Money ought to know in what manner it is
expended.''s Stressing the significance of the accountings to electoral
politics, William Livingston stated in the New York debates, "Will not
the representatives.., consider it as essential to their popularity, to
gratify their constituents with full and frequent statements of the public
accounts? There can be no doubt of it."'
' 83
Some controlling principles of constitutional law also emerge from
the "essential postulate[s]" of "the structure of the Constitution.""'8 In
explicating the constitutional design of state and federal relations, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of political
accountability.'85 In Alden v. Maine,'86 for example, the Court struck
down a federal law authorizing private actions against non-consenting
States in state courts because the law impeded "the States' ability to
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.',,8 When the federal
government disregards the States' sovereign immunity, the Court
explained, "the course of [the States'] public policy and the
administration of their public affairs may become 'subject to and
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals without their consent,
and in favor of individual interests. '"" 88 In so doing, the federal
government "strikes at the heart of the political accountability so
essential to our liberty and republican form of government.'8
9
179. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178-79 ('974).
18o. See id. at i9 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 618 (I91I)).
181. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTrrION 459 (1836)).
182. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 150 (191 I)).
183. Id. at 199-200 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 347 (1836)).
184. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)). See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969).
I85. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999); Printz, 521 U.S. at 918, 928-30; New York v.
United States, 5o5 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
186. 527 U.S. at 706.
187. Id. at 75o-51, 754.
188. Id. at 750 (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,505 (1887)).
189. Id. at 751.
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According to the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering cases, the
federal government must refrain not only from interfering with the
States' accountability to their citizenries, but also from obstructing its
accountability to its own citizenry. In New York v. United States,'" the
Court invalidated federal legislation requiring state governments either
to take title to radioactive waste generated within their borders or to
regulate that waste according to Congress' instructions. 9' In stressing the
importance of public perceptions of the state and federal governments-
and hence providing an account of particular relevance here-the Court
explained:
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If the
citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making [a]
provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest,
they may elect state officials who share that view.... [If the Federal
Government pre-empts the States, the Federal Government] makes
the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that
suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or
unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision."'
In striking down federal legislation requiring state law enforcement
officers to help administer a federal gun control program, the Court in
Printz v. United States'93  adopted a similar rationale: the law
impermissibly "reduce[d] [the States] to puppets of a ventriloquist
Congress."''"
Applied in the government speech context, the political
accountability principle calls for governments to speak "in full view of
the public." This means that governments ought not to have the same
freedom to speak as private parties. Whereas private parties may
generally decide to express their views anonymously, in a manner that
allows them to avoid responsibility for their speech, governments,
consistent with constitutional commitments, ought to speak in a manner
190. 505 U.S. at i44.
191. Id. at 169-77, I88.
192. Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added).
193. 521 U.S. 898 (i997).
194. Id. at 928 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir.
1975)). The Court explained:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even
when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they
are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.
Id. at 930.
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that permits the polity to hold them accountable. As discussed above, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that the legitimacy of
government communications, and the use of public resources to support
them, resides in mechanisms of democratic accountability' 95 Insofar as
the government is responsive and accountable to the electorate, the
government speaks at the will of the people. A necessary condition of
this justification, of course, is that the people know of the government's
communications -that the people have a basis for evaluating, and
responding to, the government's specific communications as well as its
overall communicative agenda. Transparent government
communications are indispensable to that condition."6
As Mark Yudof and others have pointed out, democratic
government rests on the premise of the consent of the governed, and
government communications help to legitimize that premise.' 97 They
inform people of the government's policies and priorities, and explain
why those policies and priorities are correct or desirable. They assist the
citizenry in evaluating the government's performance and ultimately
determining whether to give or withhold consent. Yet the risk of
government communications, Yudof warns, is that they may lead to
"false consent."'' g As this Article has shown, when the government
communicates in a non-transparent fashion, it may, in some sense,
engineer "false consent." It may mislead the public to believe, for
example, that the government's favored views are more widely and
strongly held than they really are, or held by more authoritative and
esteemed individuals when in fact they are not.
But the argument here is neither that the government is dominating
people's minds or indoctrinating them, nor that the government is
exercising unique or heightened persuasive powers. Indeed, any speaker
can engage in such non-transparent communications and "manipulate"
source cues. The argument to restrict the government's ability to
communicate without identifying itself flows not from the claim that
government communications have a different impact than do private
communications. Rather, it rests on the claim that government speakers,
as a matter of constitutional principle, operate under obligations that do
not constrain private speakers. In other words, some types of speech by
governmental agencies and officials implicate constitutional values in
195. See cases cited supra note 43.
196. The citizenry may in some circumstances perceive non-transparent communications to be
more effective and hence more desirable. But the fact that the citizenry might agree to measures that
would inhibit its ability to hold government accountable should not on its own justify those measures.
For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 228-33.
197. See YUDOF, supra note 36, at 20-32, 141-57; see also Cole, supra note 41, at 702-04.
198. See YUDOF, supra note 36, at 152; see also Cole, supra note 41, at 704-08 (noting "specter of
government domination").
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ways that speech by private parties does not. 99 For the government to
mislead the polity through non-transparent communications is ordinarily
inconsistent with constitutional principles.
This Article calls for transparency in government communications,
not transparency in government generally. Although a lack of openness
in government raises serious accountability issues, non-transparent
communications interfere with accountability in a distinct, and in some
ways more troubling, manner. In the former context, the government
withholds information and thereby generally seeks to prevent discussion
of certain matters. In the latter context, the government withholds its
identity while actively disseminating information or ideas to the public.
While both types of non-disclosure can have significant consequences for
public debate, the latter causes particular concern in that it involves
affirmative efforts by the government to mislead or manipulate the
public.
Although there are strong arguments that the government generally
ought not to mislead its citizens,2" this Article calls for a narrower
principle that would simply limit the government from misleading
citizens through non-transparent communications. The distinct harm to
political accountability that results when government misleads by
speaking through undisclosed agents or otherwise opaquely becomes
apparent when examining more closely the problem of misleading
through false communications. When a government misleads by
disseminating false communications under its own name, the citizenry
may evaluate those communications. If the citizenry finds them to be
false, it may hold the government accountable for the deception. In some
cases, the people may decide that the government had an adequate
justification for lying; in other cases, they may decide otherwise.
Moreover, the very fact that the government is speaking will likely lead
at least some people-for example, its political opponents or the news
media-to scrutinize more carefully what the government is saying. That
expectation of scrutiny may deter governments from disseminating
falsehoods in the first place. But when the government speaks without
identifying itself, its statements are more likely to escape such
heightened scrutiny. Thus, if the government misleads by speaking
falsely through undisclosed surrogates, its falsehoods are more likely to
go unchallenged and uncorrected. And even if people find the
communication to be false, they will have no reason to hold the
government accountable.
199. Analogously, the Constitution prohibits governmental actors from doing many things that it
permits private parties to do with impunity.
200. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). Plaintiff sought relief based on alleged
deceit by the federal government about the circumstances of her husband's death, id. at 405, but the
Court dismissed the claim, on grounds unrelated to the propriety of the alleged deceit. Id. at 418-22.
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The law recognizes in many other contexts the importance of
information about the speaker to prevent forms of misleading. Consumer
protection statutes, for example, require sellers or advertisers to disclose
their identities as a means of preventing fraud. Similarly, election laws
often mandate disclosure not only to prevent corruption, but to ensure
that people do not mistake individuals to be acting independently when
they in fact are not. Colorado law, for example, requires persons
gathering signatures for ballot initiatives to wear badges indicating
whether they are "paid" or "volunteer," presumably so that people will
not assume that gatherers are acting simply on their own accord."'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the listener's need for
information about the speaker may sometimes justify limitations on First
Amendment free speech rights: "[i]dentification of the source of
advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that people will
be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected .... 
Yet justifications for such disclosure requirements often rest on the
idea that the additional information will enhance reasoned decision-
making, or, in other words, improve people's ability "to evaluate the
arguments." This Article makes no such claim. In some cases, individuals
may respond to the fact of government authorship by engaging in more
argument-based processing; they may, for example, decide that a
message disseminated by the government merits further reflection, or
ought to be considered with greater scrutiny or care. In other cases,
however, transparency may stimulate no additional argument-based
processing. The fact of government authorship may simply encourage
cue-based processing, with individuals reaching decisions on the basis of
inclinations, or assumed agreement or disagreement, rather than critical
reasoning per se."
Similarly, people often argue in favor of disclosure requirements
because they expect that certain disclosures will lead people to be more
critical, or wary, of the message presented. For example, the Colorado
"paid/volunteer" badge law likely rests on the assumption that people
asked to sign petitions will view more skeptically requests for signatures
201. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. I82, 188 (1999) (noting the
requirement but not expressing an opinion on its constitutionality). For a thoughtful discussion of the
Colorado law and other related laws, see Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct
Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (i999) [hereinafter Garrett, Money].
202. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (t978); see also McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196-97 (2003) (upholding campaign disclosure requirements that further the "First
Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political
marketplace").
203. Elizabeth Garrett has written extensively about the significance of campaign disclosure laws
for heuristic processing. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 237 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 39 U. RiCH. L. REV. tOI1 (2003).
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from people wearing "paid" badges, as opposed to "volunteer" badges. 4
Likewise, disclosure laws requiring fundraisers to inform those asked for
charitable contributions of the percentage of funds that will actually
reach the charity likely rest on the assumption that the lower the
percentage, the less likely people will contribute."' Here again this
Article makes no such claim. It makes no assumption about the likely
directional impact of a particular disclosure of governmental authorship.
As discussed above, the fact of government authorship sometimes may
enhance a message's persuasiveness, and at other times may diminish it.
Yet abiding by the transparency principle would have significant
implications for the government's overall ability to persuade. Ignoring
this principle, the government would be free either to clarify or to
obscure its identity as speaker. It is likely to do the former only when its
identity enhances, rather than diminishes, its persuasiveness. As a result,
left to its own devices, the government would most likely make its
authorship relevant only when it serves as a positive cue. By contrast,
when following the transparency principle, a government would not be
free to reveal or conceal its responsibility for a given message selectively.
Under such conditions, the government authorship cue is more likely to
function positively in some circumstances and negatively in others.
Therefore, the transparency principle would provide a structural
limitation on a government's overall ability to persuade.
In light of the political accountability rationale, one might argue that
just as the government's speech must be transparent, so too must the
government's actions.2' 6 Such an argument would generally be consistent
with the one advanced here. Yet, for at least two reasons, non-
transparent government communications trigger greater concern than do
non-transparent government actions. First, as an empirical matter,
governments seem more likely to engage in non-transparent
communications. As discussed above, governments communicate in a
non-transparent manner on a broad range of matters, and changes in
society and technology suggest that this practice will likely grow."° By
contrast, governments probably act non-transparently in a narrow range
of areas. Insofar as governments secure nongovernmental actors to
undertake traditional government functions, individuals are more likely
204. See Garrett, Money, supra note 2o, at 1882-84.
205. In Riley v. National Federation of Blind of NC., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988), the Supreme Court
struck down a North Carolina law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors,
before asking for contributions, the percentage of the prior year's charitable contributions the
fundraisers had conveyed to the charity. See id. at 795, 8oo. It noted with approval, however, the
obligation, under North Carolina law, for fundraisers to disclose contribution percentages when asked
about the practice by a potential donor. See id. at 799.
206. In many contexts, of course, it is difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between speech
and action. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
207. See supra Part III.A.
May 2005] PERSUASION, TRANSPARENCY, AND GOVERNMENTSPEECH 1023
to assume that those nongovernmental actors act at the direction, or
under some degree of supervision, of the government. Further, it bears
emphasis that although "secret" activities, such as covertly funding
Nicaraguan rebels, may be non-transparent in the traditional sense of the
word, they are not non-transparent as the term is employed here. In
those situations, the public is completely unaware of the government
actions taking place; in other words, it is not the case that the public
knows of the actions but does not know of the government's
responsibility for them. Law enforcement or undercover intelligence
operations, in which private individuals interact with government agents
but believe them to be nongovernmental, probably account for the
majority of non-transparent government actions. In those situations,
governments' failure to disclose their identities to the misled individuals
does not generally raise the type of political accountability concerns
herein discussed.
Second, non-transparent government communications may impede
political accountability to a greater extent than do non-transparent
government actions. Consider the consequences associated with the
public revelation of the government's responsibility for a particular
instance of non-transparent action as compared to those for a specific
instance of non-transparent speech. In the former situation, the
government's identity becomes publicly known, and the government
must then confront or deal with the public reaction to that revelation.
Put another way, the public can hold the government accountable for the
action. In the latter situation, by contrast, once the government's identity
becomes unveiled, more non-transparent government communications
may become part of the debate about the propriety of the original non-
transparent communications. In other words, the government may
continually employ more anonymous or pseudonymous communications
to defend the prior anonymous or pseudonymous communication that
was discovered, or even to put into doubt the discovery. This potential
for a type of recurring Escher-like deception suggests that non-
transparent speech, as opposed to non-transparent action, is more far-
reaching in terms of governments' potential to evade political
accountability.
B. ANONYMOUS GOVERNMENT SPEECH?
To establish that our constitutional regime calls for transparency in
government communications, this Article must address the fact that our
regime also recognizes the value of non-transparent communications.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized anonymity as an
important component of the free speech right, and, on that basis, has
struck down several laws compromising speakers' ability to communicate
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anonymously. 8  Notwithstanding the fact that government
communications are not ordinarily entitled to any First Amendment
protection," some might argue that we should proceed with caution
before advocating the transparency principle for any speaker, including
the government. An examination of the rationale for protecting
anonymous speech, however, suggests that society's interest in preserving
anonymity extends primarily, though not exclusively, to private speakers
rather than the government.
There are four primary justifications for protecting the right to
anonymous, or pseudonymous, communications. First, anonymity
promotes speech by insulating speakers from retaliation."' As the
Supreme Court has stated, anonymity "exemplifies the purpose behind
the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from
suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society .... Anonymity
encourages the free expression of ideas because it enables those with
unpopular views to escape not only physical and economic reprisals but
also belittlement or social ostracism. Indeed, the drafters of the original
antecedents of the First Amendment wrote anonymously." ' The real
threat of violence for supposedly "free" speech, as evidenced during the
i960s civil rights movement,"3 provides a compelling reason against
transparency, in favor of anonymity.
Second, anonymity encourages speech from those who wish to avoid
self-revelation."4 Some people, for example, those who are shy or who
question their communication abilities, hesitate to speak because they
2o8. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 154-
56, 160-64 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 6o, 6o-6s,65 (s96o).
209. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 & n.7 (i973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its
own expression."); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (First Amendment
does not constrain government expression of political views). The First Amendment might protect
state government communications from federal restriction. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-2 (1978) (recognizing a First Amendment claim of a state university to
design its educational program). The First Amendment might also protect speech by government
employees on behalf of the government from restriction by that same government. See, e.g., Cockrel
v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 27o F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that public elementary school
teacher's curricular choice constituted speech protected by the First Amendment); Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920,947 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacating as moot, 520 U.S. 43
(1997) (holding that an English-only language restriction on a state employee's speech used in
handling medical malpractice claims violated the First Amendment).
210. See Lee, supra note I 17, at text accompanying notes 21-22.
211. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
212. See Erika King, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 144, 163-64 (1995) (discussing Letters of Cato and Letters of Junius).
213. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462-63 (1958).
214. See Lee, supra note I I7, at text accompanying notes 25-26.
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are wary of revealing "too much" about themselves. Empowered through
anonymity, those individuals may gain the confidence to speak. Others
want, or need, to talk about intensely personal or private matters, but
will not do so unless they can speak anonymously. The proliferation of
confidential hotlines provides evidence of the success of anonymity in
enabling those who are, for instance, victims of sexual or substance abuse
to communicate their concerns and to seek assistance. Still others do not
dread speaking in public or seek to discuss personal matters, but simply
wish to avoid being publicly associated with an idea. For them, the
availability of anonymity leads them to express ideas or opinions publicly
when they otherwise might remain silent.
Third, anonymity may further the unbiased evaluation of speech."5 It
is often assumed that identification of the speaker enhances people's
ability to assess the truthfulness or accuracy of speech because they can
discern the speaker's basis of knowledge or reputation for truthfulness." '
Yet knowledge of a speaker's identity may also diminish listeners'
evaluative capacities."' People may have positive or negative
preconceptions, based on factors unrelated to the issue under discussion,
about certain speakers that can lead them to pay less attention to the
ideas presented. As discussed above, instead of evaluating the merits of a
claim, sometimes people overvalue the source and undervalue the
argument. People therefore may be more likely to accept statements
made by high-status speakers and to reject those by low-status speakers
prematurely."I By contrast, under conditions of anonymity, listeners are
unaware of the speaker's status characteristics, and "the concomitant
biases and prejudices that tend to advantage dominant groups while
disadvantaging marginal others then become mitigated.
'219
Fourth, anonymity encourages speech at the margins."' When certain
types of speech can bring criminal or civil liability, individuals may speak
with "excess caution" because of the potential adverse consequences." '
That is, individuals may refrain from engaging in legally protected speech
if they mistakenly fear it will lead to liability. Through making it more
215. See id. at text accompanying notes to-II.
216. See, e.g., Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (1963).
217. See Lee, supra note 117, at text accompanying notes 12-15.
218. See, e.g., JOSEPH BERGER ET AL., STATUS CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (1977);
Margaret T. Lee & Richard Ofshe, The Impact of Behavioral Style and Status Characteristics on Social
Influence: A Test of Two Competing Theories, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 73 (198i). See generally PIERRE
BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew
Anderson trans., 1991) (developing a theory of discourse explaining how relationships of power affect
who may speak, to whom, and how).
219. See Lee, supra note 117, at text accompanying notes 12-15.
220. See id. at text accompanying notes 27-28.
221. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U. L. REV. 685,689-94 (1978).
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difficult for a government or others to enforce laws regulating speech, or,
in other words, enhancing people's ability to escape liability by evading
identification, anonymity minimizes the chilling effect of speech-
restricting laws.
Those four justifications apply with varying force to government
communications. In some respects, it is precisely against society's interest
to insulate government speech from retaliation. In light of democratic
commitments to responsive governance, it will often be desirable for
governments to refrain from expressing unpopular views or to face social
condemnation for doing so. Indeed, the people's ultimate "retaliation"-
holding governments accountable for undesirable action and expression
by "voting the bums out"-is a fundamental feature of democracy. When
the government must, or should, take unpopular positions, as the federal
government had to do in the Reconstruction South, it usually has ample
resources to defend itself and its views. It has, for instance, significant
means to identify those responsible for unlawful retaliatory measures
and to initiate a civil or criminal action for any illegality associated with
those measures. Awareness of the government's resources, moreover,
makes it less likely that individuals will respond to government
communications in a threatening, or violent, manner.
Yet society has a strong interest in preserving anonymity to prevent
retaliation for at least some government speakers. In particular,
anonymity can empower government whistleblowers, those officials and
employees who wish to expose public corruption but risk retaliation for
doing so.222 Although the public may rely on other means to encourage
speech from whistleblowers - for example, offering financial or other
incentives, or providing statutory penalties for retaliation223 -some risk-
averse whistleblowers may speak only on the condition of anonymity.
Given its expected content, whistleblower speech, even if anonymous,
likely enhances, rather than undermines, the public's ability to hold
governments accountable for their actions. In light of the fundamental
importance of bringing governmental wrongdoing to light, it may be that
the interest in encouraging whistleblower speech trumps the interest in
having the government speaker self-identify. 4
The general inapplicability of the self-revelation concern for shy or
222. Although one might question whether such individuals speak in their private or official
capacities-a difficult question applicable to any government official or employee in certain cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 24o-46-it seems clear that exposing government fraud or misconduct
falls, or at least ought to fall, within the scope of employment of most public servants.
223. See generally Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and
the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of
Employers, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316 (I993).
224. As discussed below, the transparency principle is not absolute. See infra text accompanying
notes 26o-6i.
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reserved speakers, or for personal or private matters, to government
communications requires little discussion. A government agency or
official usually has strong incentives to speak publicly and is not likely to
suffer from the type of shyness or heightened reserve that might silence
some private individuals. Nor does it generally make sense to conceive of
government matters as personal or private (though they may be
confidential). The other self-revelation concern-the desire to avoid
being publicly associated with certain speech-does apply, however,
particularly in the context of anonymous leaks of sensitive or confidential
information. Sometimes when government employees leak confidential
or classified matters, they act on their own initiative, without the
approval of their superiors.225 Insofar as they leak for whistleblower-like
purposes, it may be that their ability to do so anonymously ought to be
protected. To the extent that they leak largely for personal gain, they are
best understood to speak as private individuals, rather than on behalf of
the government. Sometimes, by contrast, government employees leak
information at the direction, or with the consent, of their superiors."6 In
those circumstances, involving "controlled leaks," government speakers
may speak anonymously to avoid not retaliation or bias, but association
with the views expressed. 27
The question whether "controlled leaks" ought to be encouraged, or
at least tolerated, is a difficult one. Controlled leaks may be a useful
government tool, and in some cases may actually serve to enhance the
possibilities for political accountability. For example, government
officials may use controlled leaks as trial balloons, as a means of taking
public sentiment into account before embarking on a proposed course of
action."5 Absent the ability to do so, the government simply might not
risk seemingly unpopular action of which the public might actually
approve, or might persist with unpopular action because of a reluctance
to retreat from a publicly declared course. Also, controlled leaks provide
the public with at least some information from, or about, the
government, and if the choice is between controlled leaks and no leaks,
the former might better serve the purpose of accountability.
But controlled leaks also hinder accountability. As with most forms
of anonymous government communications, controlled leaks involve
225. For an insightful typology of leaks and discussion of many examples thereof, see STEPHEN
HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION: PRESS OFFICERS AND THEIR OFFICES 77-78 (1984). For
further discussion of examples applying this typology, see generally ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES
IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 18-21 (1987); MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS
FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 194-97 (1986).
226. See HEss, supra note 225, at 75-78.
227. Stephen Hess notes that some people refer to authorized leaks as "plants," rather than
"leaks." Id.
228. See id. at 77; ABEL, supra note 225, at 20-21; LINSKY, supra note 225, at 195.
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instances in which the government ultimately seeks to influence or
persuade the public without the public's knowledge. The government can
selectively choose the information it seeks to disclose while avoiding
criticism for the information's content or release."' It is true that many
press reports indicate when information comes from an anonymous
government official, and that that mitigates some accountability concerns.
The lack of identification of the specific source, however, undermines the
public's ability to hold a specific individual or part of government
responsible. Controlled leaks generally involve situations where the
government seeks to have it both ways. The government categorizes
information as sensitive or confidential and therefore prevents its
dissemination, yet, when disclosure may reap some benefit, it secretly
releases the information, while publicly continuing to insist on the
information's sensitivity. The availability of controlled leaks, therefore,
may actually dampen the government's incentives to make information
freely and fully available. Ultimately, the government likely makes many
controlled leaks for reasons of "politics," rather than "policy," and it is
unclear whether such political maneuvering generally ought to be
protected or encouraged. 3
The argument that anonymity may further the unbiased evaluation
of speech has some force with respect to government speech. Individuals
may sometimes be suspicious or skeptical of the government. Allowing
the government to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously will
diminish the likelihood that its positions will be dismissed out of hand as
mere propaganda, or be subject to negative preconceptions.23' So, if some
teenagers were to ignore official governmental warnings about drunk
driving simply because they think the government is "uncool," then there
would be some value in allowing the government to communicate its
message anonymously or pseudonymously through television programs
such as "E.R." or "Beverly Hills 90210." In other words, for some
messages, it may be desirable to eliminate anti-government bias.
Sometimes individuals may not be skeptical of the government view,
but, to the contrary, be predisposed to accept it. In those cases, society
might prefer anonymous government communications because
individuals will be less likely to accept uncritically, or defer to, official
views. In some cases, individuals may see the government as especially
229. See HESS, supra note 225, at 75 (referring to a "beneficial leak" or "plant" as "premature
authorized partial disclosure" (emphasis added)).
230. This account should in no way suggest that leaks in general are bad or undesirable. Indeed,
insofar as they make government policies and practices more transparent, they play an invaluable role
in democratic government. This account focuses instead on leaks sanctioned by the government, which
are less likely to play such a transparency-enhancing role.
231. Of course the fact of anonymity may itself function as a cue, and people may be more
skeptical or more likely to examine critically an anonymous communication.
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competent or trustworthy, and may thus be all too willing to adopt
official views as their own. For example, if a local environmental agency,
at the direction of a mayor captured by pollutant donors, issues a
statement finding air pollution levels to be non-toxic, then the
government-labeled message might hinder critical evaluation because
citizens might unduly defer to the apparent expertise of the agency.
In other cases, individuals may defer not so much because they trust
or respect the government, but because they fear it. When the
government identifies speech as its own, some individuals, particularly
vulnerable ones, may fear (real or imagined) consequences of rejecting
the speech and may adopt the suggested point of view not because they
agree on the merits but because they associate the view with the
government.23' Upon seeing a government poster warning of the risks of
abortion, for instance, a recent immigrant might infer (even if
incorrectly) the linkage of unrelated government benefits with
acceptance of the government's position. The risk and severity of such
perceived pressure will likely vary depending on the subject matter and
the political climate.
In terms of reducing undue bias, a general prohibition on
anonymous and pseudonymous government communications then will
surely have its costs. Yet, because of the strong accountability interest in
informing the citizenry of government communication efforts, adopting
the transparency principle may well be worth the costs. Also, in light of
the relative difficulty of identifying with any precision the circumstances
under which governments ought to and ought not to be permitted to
communicate anonymously, it seems preferable generally to forbid
governments from doing so than to permit them the choice of whether
and where to do so. As discussed above, when the government can
choose to communicate anonymously, it will likely do so only when it
believes that its identity will handicap, rather than enhance, its
persuasiveness. Giving the government, or indeed anyone, the choice of
whether to communicate anonymously will not evenhandedly decrease
biases and prejudices, but instead will decrease only negative biases or
prejudices.
The argument for anonymity based on the potential for decreasing
bias is most compelling in contexts in which the universe of speakers
includes speakers whose contributions are chronically devalued. It seems
implausible to assert that governments in contemporary social and
political life generally fall within that category of speakers. Even if they
were so perceived, the encroaching nature of government power
generally would call for institutional arrangements that encourage, rather
than diminish, people's tendencies to evaluate government
232. I thank Seana Shiffrin for stressing the importance of making this point.
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communications critically.33 That removing anonymity as an option for
government speech could sometimes place a heavier burden on
governments, as opposed to private speakers, to make a convincing case
on a matter thus seems appropriate, and indeed desirable.
The fourth argument in favor of anonymity, encouraging speech at
the margins, is less salient in the government speech context. As
governments retain primary responsibility for the enforcement of the
laws, many speech restrictions that might chill private speech will have
no effect on government speech. To the extent that a government might
be sued for violating a speech restriction-either by a private party or
another governmental entity (for example, the federal government might
sue a state or local government) - there already exist many structural and
institutional accommodations, such as the doctrines of sovereign
immunity or other types of immunities, that protect the abilities of
governments to express their views.234 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,3' for example, the
Supreme Court recently held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes
Congress from relying on its Article I powers, including its power under
the Patents and Copyrights Clause, to authorize private parties to bring
damages actions against states for patent infringement."' Based on the
Court's reasoning in that case, courts have likewise held that, absent its
consent to suit, a state also may not be held liable to private parties for
copyright infringement. '37 Even in the absence of applicable immunities
or protections, moreover, in light of the unique and competing incentives
in the political sphere, it remains a substantial question whether, and to
what extent, the risk of damages liability in any given instance would
chill government communications.23 8
In sum, the reasons for according anonymity to private speakers do
not apply with equal force to governments. Whereas private parties
would suffer significantly in their ability to express their ideas freely and
fully absent the veil of anonymity or pseudonymity, governments
generally would not be so hindered. While the government may of course
sometimes have compelling interests in communicating in a non-
233. Cf. Blasi, supra note 177 (discussing the "checking" value of the First Amendment).
234. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
235. 527 U.S. 627 0999).
236. Id. at 636.
237. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 6oi, 607 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from copyright infringement where Congress did not abrogate
immunity under Section 5 of the i4 th Amendment); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 73 n.16 (1996) (suggesting federal copyright statute did not abrogate state sovereign
immunity).
238. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, And The Allocation Of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHi. L. Rev. 345 (2000) (arguing that government actors respond to
political, rather than financial, incentives).
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transparent manner, non-transparency ought to be the rare and difficult
exception, rather than the taken-for-granted rule.39 Transparency plays
an essential role in enabling the accountability, and hence legitimacy, of
government communications. Thus, as the First Amendment implicitly
protects the rights of private parties to speak anonymously, the
Constitution as a whole implicitly suggests governments should not so
speak.
V. TRANSPARENCY IN PRACTICE
This Part turns to the practical implications of the transparency
principle. Two basic questions emerge. First, what are the contours of
this principle? When does it apply, and what does it demand? Second,
what role, if any, should the courts play with respect to this principle? Is
the transparency principle simply a constitutional ideal that all those
sworn to uphold the Constitution ought to respect, or does it also have
implications for the work of the courts? In other words, are there
instances where courts ought to examine the issue of transparency in
government communications? This Part considers these questions in
turn.
A. THE CONTOURS OF TRANSPARENCY
According to the transparency principle, whenever the government
seeks to communicate its view, it should identify itself, so that listeners
understand that the message emanates from the government. Most
listeners generally attribute speech to the individual delivering a
message, or to the institution that the individual represents. If, for
example, a local health department official identified as such delivers an
anti-alcohol message, absent a disclaimer, most audiences will interpret
that message to come from the health department and the government.
But if a government contractor who appears independent delivers that
same message without disclosing its relationship with the government,
most audiences will understand the message to be from the contractor,
not the government. The transparency principle becomes particularly
relevant in the latter context, requiring individuals or institutions that
convey governmental views, but are not readily identifiable as being
connected with the government, to disclose the fact of government
authorship or control.
Following this principle, of course, is not always so straightforward.
As an initial matter, even when government officials or employees speak,
it is not always so clear whether they speak in their official or personal
capacities. Consider, for instance, one of the examples referred to at the
beginning of this Article, Chief Justice John Marshall's pseudonymous
239. See infra text accompanying notes 256-61.
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defense of McCulloch v. Maryland. Shortly after McCulloch's issuance,
several pseudonymous newspaper essays attacked its reasoning as
endorsing a virtually unlimited central authority.4 Publishing a series of
essays in response under the pen names "A Friend to the Union" and "A
Friend of the Constitution," Marshall denied the charge of consolidation
and "insist[ed], with more emphasis than in McCulloch itself, that those
principles did not give Congress carte blanche, that they did preserve a
true federal system in which the central government was limited in its
powers-and that the limits were capable of judicial enforcement. '
Motivated by fear that "the constitution would be converted into the old
confederation,.242 John Marshall, Gerald Gunther observes, "had a
passionate personal commitment to the principles of McCulloch."43
There, it is unclear whether Marshall wrote as a government official
or a concerned private citizen. It may be that he wrote as both. Because
of the interest in safeguarding the private individual's First Amendment
right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, we should err in favor
of protecting that right and assume in close cases like Marshall's that a
government employee or official speaks as a private party, to whom the
transparency principle would not apply. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, individuals who work for the government do not forfeit their
First Amendment rights by virtue of the fact of public employment.'
Employees should generally be able to communicate their private or
personal views anonymously or pseudonymously as long as doing so
would not unduly interfere with the government's "effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public." '245 Although some might
argue that speakers should disclose at least their employment status with
the government, the significant likelihood that any meaningful disclosure
would compromise the individuals' identities-meaningful, in the sense
that message recipients would then be able to hold the appropriate
governmental bodies accountable-counsels against calling for the
disclosure.
The assumption in favor of anonymity for government employees or
240. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 4, at 13-16
(discussing articles in the Richmond Enquirer written under the pen names Amphictyon and
Hampden, and attributing the former to Judge William Brockenbrough and the latter to Judge
Spencer Roane, both of whom sat on Virginia state courts).
241. Id. at I8-I9. Marshall published the "A Friend to the Union" essays in the PHILADELPHIA
UNION and the "A Friend to the Constitution" essays in the ALEXANDRIA GAZETE. See id. at I.
242. Id. at 15 (quoting Marshall's correspondence to Justice Joseph Story).
243. Id. at 18.
244. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968).
245. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (recognizing
the government's ability to restrain the speech of its employees if that speech interferes with the
government's ability to carry out its responsibilities).
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officials should apply only to those cases in which a reasonable argument
can be made that the individual speaks in her personal capacity.
Applying the assumption more broadly would otherwise undermine the
transparency principle. While determining the assumption's applicability
would involve a context-specific inquiry, several factors should receive
heightened consideration. First, does the speech fall within the scope of
the speaker's official duties? Second, does the speaker use government
resources to develop or disseminate the message? Third, does the
speaker receive official recognition or reward for the message? Fourth,
must the speaker secure official approval before disseminating the
message? While none of those factors alone, or in combination, should
be dispositive, 46 the more factors indicating the speaker's or speech's
independence from her governmental role, the more likely, of course, it
would be reasonable to conclude that the employee speaks in her
personal capacity.
The other context raising thorny issues about the contours of the
transparency principle involves government subsidies. There, a similar
question arises as to when one should attribute to the government views
expressed by private parties. Sometimes, the issue seems relatively
straightforward. When the government subsidizes the expression of a
specific idea (e.g., "capital punishment is necessary" or "smoking is
bad"), or, in common First Amendment parlance, imposes viewpoint-
based restrictions on government subsidies, it seems likely that the
government seeks to advance that particular perspective, or at least
ascribes value to its dissemination.47 In that circumstance, it would be
appropriate to assume that the government seeks to communicate a view
for which it should be held accountable. By contrast, when the
government subsidizes expression on a basis that has no connection with
the idea expressed (e.g., on a first-come, first-served basis), or, in other
words, on a content-neutral basis, it seems more likely that the
government aims not to communicate any particular idea or view, but
instead simply to increase speech opportunities. Although that choice
itself reflects fundamental value judgments (e.g., more speech is
desirable), for which governments might be held accountable, it would be
less appropriate in such instances to characterize the government as
seeking to communicate its views.
The issue of characterization becomes more difficult when the
government subsidizes expression about a particular subject matter, but
imposes no limitations on the viewpoints that can be taken on that
246. It is not uncommon, for example, for employees in the intelligence field to agree to official
prepublication clearance of all personal writings having any relation to their employment. See, e.g.,
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (i98o). That the employees must secure governmental
approval does not necessarily mean that they speak in their official, rather than personal, capacities.
247. See generally Redish & Kessler, supra note 41 (distinguishing types of government subsidies).
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matter, or, in other words, when the government adopts content-based,
rather than viewpoint-based, subsidy restrictions (e.g., "speech about
capital punishment" or "speech about smoking"). One might argue that,
just as in the content-neutral subsidy context, the government does not
aim to persuade audiences to adopt a particular position or viewpoint
and thus should not be seen as recruiting others to communicate
governmental views. Yet, unlike in that context, the focused subsidies
encourage expression about particular issues, and ultimately seek to lead
audiences to think about, or even accord importance to, those issues
(e.g., attention to race discrimination rather than discrimination based on
sexual orientation). As the ability to influence the agenda of public
debate has powerful political significance,24' it seems appropriate to infer
that speakers who highlight a particular issue are communicating at the
government's behest. For content-based subsidies about subjects for
which there is widespread social consensus, such as "speech about
domestic violence," moreover, it may be that, though the subsidy is
viewpoint-neutral on its face, the government may anticipate, and in fact
desire, that the speakers express a particular, favored view.
While it is difficult to delineate with precision which subsidies
involve government efforts to communicate its views, it seems clear that
the burden imposed by a disclosure requirement would be relatively
minimal. Accordingly, a general transparency requirement applicable to
all content-based or viewpoint-based governmentally subsidized speech
would be most consistent with the constitutional commitment to political
accountability. Although such a requirement would be over-inclusive and
would sweep in instances where the government provides subsidies
simply to encourage private communications and not to further any
particular message or idea, rules furthering constitutional purposes are
often broadly prophylactic in nature, designed to over-protect the
fundamental principle at stake.249 Also, the extent of the mandated
disclosure would take into account the differences among types of
subsidies. Having accepted a content- or viewpoint-based subsidy, a
speaker would have to disclose both the fact of the government subsidy
and the nature of the accompanying restriction.
Such disclosure should be made even if the speech accurately
reflects the speaker's independently held views. Even if a speaker shares
certain views with the government, he might not have expressed a
particular opinion, or expressed it in the same manner or to the same
248. See Mutz, supra note 145, at 89-91; cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) ("[B]y
directing the citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color [through a ballot label], the
State indicates that a candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-consideration in
the citizen's choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.").
249. See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 190
(1988).
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extent, without the government's financial incentive. But even if he
would have done so, disclosure is still necessary, for it informs listeners of
the government's influence or impact not only on the speaker who
discloses, but also on the broader universe of speakers, some of whom
may have chosen to express a differing or contrary position but were
denied governmental support to do so. That a speaker might prefer the
audience to understand his position to be only his own, rather than the
government's, does not alter that analysis. Notwithstanding the
disclosure, a speaker can still make clear that he would have taken the
same position even absent the government's support. It is true that
disclosure of government support may affect the way in which audiences
receive the speaker's ideas; for example, it may prompt closer scrutiny,
or prevent the operation of one or more of the cues discussed above. But
there is no obvious reason why a speaker who accepts government funds
to speak ought to be able to avoid additional scrutiny.25 Indeed, such
scrutiny may be the necessary cost, in the interests of democratic
accountability, of accepting government support."'
Some might question why the transparency principle should apply
stringently to government contractors, but not to government employees.
Indeed, the apparent inconsistency in treatment seems to contradict the
Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, which accords government
contractors and employees similar protections against official
retaliation.5 Yet it should be noted that the principle does not
completely disallow anonymity for government contractors. The
transparency principle requires identification not of the private
individual or institution delivering the message, but of the government
and its role. In other words, government contractors can speak
anonymously or pseudonymously; they must disclose only any
government support for the message. Government employees may avoid
disclosure only when it is reasonable to conclude that they speak on their
own accord, independent of the government.
The differential treatment for government employees and
contractors lies in the applicability of the assumption in favor of finding
private speech even when it appears that both private and official speech
are at issue. The assumption applies to employees alone because of the
particular difficulties employees would face in attempting to speak about
250. By analogy, in the jury context, government witnesses. upon questioning from the adverse
party, must often disclose any benefits that they received in exchange for testifying.
251. To the extent that a speaker claims he would have expressed the view in the same manner, to
the same extent, even absent government support, any claim that such a cost would be unfair seems
mitigated by the fact that the speaker did not actually need to accept the government subsidy to
express his view.
252. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), with Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
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an issue relating to their employment without the mandatory disclosure.
Because disclosure of government ties can place speakers' anonymity at
risk, some government employees will likely forego speaking rather than
either risk identification or sever their governmental ties (i.e., resign). By
contrast, government contractors may at once receive government
resources for some of its speech and use its own resources when it seeks
to speak without disclosure. Though, of course, some contractors may
lack the financial means to do so, the fact remains that it is generally
simpler for government contractors to act in a manner that establishes
the independence of their speech from the government-and therefore
avoid the required disclosure-than for government employees to do so.
Turning to the nature of the disclosure, some might argue that
transparency could be achieved without requiring specific disclosure of
each individual subsidy. The government could instead simply publish or
codify the general subsidy regimes in legislation, administrative
regulations, or some central registry. 53 But such general means of
notification are insufficient to render communications transparent. Most
members of the public have neither the resources nor the interest to
follow the development of governmental policy closely. It is thus
unrealistic to assume that recipients of governmental messages will
become so well-versed in the extensive universe of governmental
programs and funding as to know when a government bears
responsibility for particular speech. Disclosure should thus accompany
the actual commuication.
Some might also object that such a requirement would conflict with
society's general presumption, exemplified by the maxim "ignorance of
the law is no excuse," that individuals are familiar with laws and
regulations. While that presumption may be justified on a number of
grounds,255 its ultimate justification likely lies in the enforcement
253. If there were such a registry, then the law would presume, as it does in the context of the
filed-rate doctrine, that people know of the registry's contents. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office
Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998).
254. Also, the social science research indicates that people take into account speaker identity at
the start of evaluating a message, and that subsequent information about the speaker rarely leads
individuals to rethink their evaluations. See O'KEEFE, supra note 61, at 142 (citing studies showing that
"the impact of communicator credibility appears to be minimized when the identity of the source is
withheld from the audience until after the message is presented"). This research suggests that
disclosure should accompany the communication at the start of the communication rather than at the
end.
255. The maxim may rest on the assumption that many laws reflect socially agreed upon morals
and are thus already knowable. See Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of
Justice, 8 PsYcHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 3, i (2002) ("[T]he legal maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no
excuse' seems to reflect the dispositional assumption that 'good' persons will somehow know or intuit
the law-and obey it-where 'bad' persons simply will not."). For complex regulatory schemes that
may not reflect such morals (e.g., the laws of heavily regulated industries), the maxim may be justified
on the ground that society may legitimately place the cost of learning the law on those who wish to
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problems that would result absent the presumption. If the government
had to ensure that individuals knew, or had reason to know, of rules and
regulations beyond the fact of their codification, the administrative and
enforcement costs would be enormous. A government simply cannot
inform each individual of its laws and regulations prior to each individual
act.
Yet government communications do not raise the same types of
practical difficulties. Whenever the government or someone acting on its
behalf delivers a message, there is a distinct opportunity to disclose the
origins of and support for that message. The government can require
disclosure of its identity each time it, or another, communicates a
government message. As accountability concerns generally counsel in
favor of individuals actually knowing of the government's speech
activities, the ready availability of an opportunity to disclose suggests
that governments ought not to rely simply on the fact of codification to
assume recipients' knowledge of the government's responsibility for a
program of speech. In other words, because of the relative ease in
effectuating disclosure with the message, the government ought not to be
able to rely on less accessible or effective means of disclosure and
thereby hamper accountability.
The "stand by your ad" provision of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002256 provides a useful precedent for the disclosure
requirement. Designed to combat negative campaigning by making
candidates "more accountable, 257 the provision requires candidates in
federal elections to approve their television and radio commercials
within the advertisement itself. A television commercial, for example,
must include either "an unobscured, full-screen view of the candidate
making the statement [of approval]" or a voice-over by the candidate,
"accompanied by a clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of
the candidate." 8 The commercial must also display the candidate's
statement of approval "in writing at the end of the communication in a
clearly readable manner with a reasonable degree of color contrast
between the background and the printed statement, for a period of at
least 4 seconds." 59 The provision's specificity aims to ensure that the
disclosures are meaningful. Although some recipients may eventually
overlook or ignore the disclosures because of their ubiquity, there, as in
take part in certain types of activities.
256. 2 U.S.C. § 44id (2002).
257. Jessica Wehrman, Political Operatives Don't Approve of New TV Ad Rule, ScRIPPS HOWARD
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 2004; see also Garry South, When the Mud Flies This Time, Bush Can't Duck;
Campaign Rules Now Force a Candidate to Own Up to Attack Ads on Air and in His or Her Own
Voice, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at B15.




the government speech context, the disclosures nonetheless provide
important information for those who care, or would care if made aware,
of the messages' origins. Also, in both the campaign and government
speech contexts, though the disclosures may detract from the messages'
effectiveness, that may be a necessary cost of enhancing accountability.
Finally, the transparency principle is not absolute. It is well-
established that the public interest in maintaining mechanisms of
political accountability must sometimes give way to a government's
specific need for safeguarding confidentiality."6 That point applies
equally when the government needs to communicate anonymously or
pseudonymously. Therefore, when the government has a heightened
interest in maintaining its anonymity or pseudonymity, and alternative
means of open communication are insufficient, the transparency
principle should not constrain the government. As suggested earlier, for
example, the interest in protecting government whistleblowers would
likely qualify for an exception to the transparency principle. 6I
B. TRANSPARENCY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The foregoing discussion, calling for a form of heightened scrutiny
analysis akin to that applied by courts in numerous constitutional
contexts, inevitably raises the issue of judicial enforceability. One might
confuse the question whether courts ought to enforce a constitutional
principle with the question whether the principle gives rise to a
freestanding cause of action, or, in other words, a judicially enforceable
right. As the remainder of the Article makes clear, however, the two
inquiries are analytically distinct. While the transparency principle does
not give rise to a judicially enforceable right, the courts nevertheless have
an important role to play in ensuring government compliance with the
principle.
i. Transparency as a Judicially Enforceable Right?
In his important article Government of the Good, Abner Greene
advances a powerful argument in favor of affording broad latitude to the
government to participate in public debate and promote its conception of
the good life." In doing so, he recognizes, however, that a limited
number of concerns, in particular, monopolization, coercion, or
ventriloquism, may require that such participation be restricted or
invalidated. 63 Monopolization arises if government communications
26o. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (i93i) (suggesting that the government
could prohibit, as a prior restraint, publication of "sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops"); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
730 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
262. Greene, supra note 37.
263. Id. at 27-52.
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actually dominate a relevant speech market. Coercion occurs if the
government requires others to accept, or adopt, its views or else risk
some form of penalty.26' The final concern, ventriloquism, corresponds in
significant part with the concept of non-transparency: ventriloquism
occurs when the government uses others to promote its views, without
disclosing that it is the ultimate source of those views.265
According to Greene, courts should invalidate specific government
communications only on the basis of the first two concerns,
monopolization or coercion 66 Greene considers ventriloquism relevant
to the courts only to the extent it indicates monopolization or coercion.67
Ventriloquism, he maintains, is not a sufficient ground in itself to doubt
the constitutionality of government speech "in part.., because the
government can easily remedy ventriloquism by disclosure; in part...
because citizens will often know speech is dictated by the government
even if no disclosure is made; and in part... because ventriloquism is
more a concern of political theory than of constitutional law.'268 Insofar
as ventriloquism is relevant in constitutional law, he asserts, it is "a
matter of ideal constitutional theory (to be followed by government
officials and legislators) and not a ground for judicial invalidation of
government speech."'69
Yet ventriloquism, or more broadly, the lack of transparency in
government communications, undermines the legitimacy of those
communications -and, indeed, the broader project of self-government-
in manners distinct from the ways that monopolization and coercion do.
Non-transparent communications do not simply pose the risk that the
government will dominate a speech market or force others to adopt its
ideas. Rather, as this Article argues, non-transparent communications
undermine mechanisms of political accountability, both by precluding
individuals from knowing when, and to what extent, the government is
responsible for specific speech and by enabling the government to skew
individuals' perceptions of the actual support for its ideas."' The fact that
the lack of transparency can easily be remedied by disclosure or may
often not be a problem does not establish that, when it does occur, it is
any less serious, or, in other words, not of constitutional significance."'
264. Id. at 27-49.
265. Id. at 49.




270. Greene acknowledges that transparency can "enhance[] accountability" and adds that it can
"help[] to ward off monopolization" by enabling individuals to know when the government is the sole
source of a viewpoint. Id. at 49-50.
271. Indeed, to the extent it is true that the problem may be easily remedied and may not occur
too often, that militates in favor of recognizing it as capable of judicial review.
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Greene's final objection, that transparency is more a concern of political
theory than of constitutional law, rests on a constrained vision of the
Constitution. As discussed above, an indisputable foundational principle
of the Constitution is its guarantee of democracy and political
accountability; the lack of transparency in government communications
substantially undermines those constitutional commitments. 72
The question whether transparency in government communications
ought to be viewed only as a hortatory constitutional ideal to be followed
by those sworn to uphold the Constitution or rather as a judicially
enforceable constitutional requirement is a more complicated one.
Usually, a matter of constitutional significance is deemed to fall beyond
the scope of judicial enforcement because of institutional concerns such
as the separation of powers or judicial competence."' While the issue of
transparency in government communications is not the sort of matter
that falls within the exclusive authority of the executive or legislative
branches, it would generally be inappropriate for judicial resolution.
As an initial matter, the number of government communications is
virtually unlimited, and recognizing a judicially enforceable right to
transparent government communications, or, in other words, a right not
to be subject to non-transparent communications, could overwhelm the
work of the courts. Even assuming there were a limited number of cases,
the task of enforcing judicial remedies through overseeing all subsequent
related government communications could be all-consuming. Beyond
manageability concerns, the particular difficulty sometimes in identifying
who speaks for the government and when they do so, and the delicate
inter-branch tensions that may arise when the courts become involved in
making such determinations, generally counsel against judicial
intervention. More important, should the courts begin to hear cases
against government officials or employees who (reasonably) assumed
they spoke as private citizens under conditions of anonymity, the chilling
effect on the speech of those individuals and others could be substantial.
In light of those myriad concerns, the transparency principle should
generally serve as a constitutional ideal, rather than a judicially
enforceable right.274
272. See supra Part IV.A.
273. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
274. The press, of course, can play some role in ensuring transparency. Indeed, the impetus for this
Article came from press reports about the White House's anti-drug message arrangements with the
television networks. Yet several factors suggest that the press may not sufficiently deter and detect
abuses of this sort. They include, among others, the difficulty in policing the extraordinary number of
government communications; the unlikelihood of investigating the full range of government
communications, many of which do not involve high-profile matters; and the seemingly growing
tendency of the press to temper its political reporting in order to curry favor with, and thereby secure
access to, government officials.
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2. The "Government Speech" Defense
Though it does not give rise to an independent cause of action, the
transparency principle should nonetheless in some cases be grounds for
judicial invalidation of conduct or communications that the government
defends on "government speech" grounds. In certain areas of
constitutional adjudication, it makes sense, as a matter of theory and
practice, for courts to take into account the issue of transparency, even
when not subsumed within questions of monopolization and coercion.
Such instances arise when a private party claims an infringement of First
Amendment rights,275 and the government defends its action on the
ground that the contested speech is properly understood as government
speech, rather than private speech. As discussed in detail below, this
"government speech" defense rests on the idea that the government
generally "is entitled to say what it wishes, ' '276 and arises most commonly
in mandatory speech assessment and government subsidy cases.
Although there has been doctrinal confusion as to when speech ought to
be attributed to private parties or the government, courts have generally
accepted and applied the government speech defense. 7 Earlier this
The legislative or executive branches might also enact legislation or issue executive orders,
respectively, in furtherance of the transparency principle. Such laws or orders would need to take into
account the manageability, inter-branch relationship, and chilling effect concerns mentioned above.
275. Since the argument for transparency flows from the interests of the listener, it may seem
anomalous to argue that courts should enforce this requirement only when the interests of speakers,
rather than listeners, are at stake. But the generalized constitutional requirement that government
communicate transparently may not be justiciable in the majority of cases. Thus, to enforce this
principle, courts must be vigilant to ensure transparency in cases where there are allegations of direct
infringement of a speaker's First Amendment right. The inquiry into transparency evaluates whether a
court should recognize the government's interest in speaking as substantial enough to justify a
potential restriction of private speakers' First Amendment rights. Furthermore, even in the context of
the First Amendment, courts often accord protection to speech because of listeners' interests -indeed,
protection for the "marketplace of ideas" is primarily based on such interests-yet courts do not
generally allow listeners, rather than speakers, to raise First Amendment claims.
276. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (I995).
277. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004); Griffin v.
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Wells v. City & County of Denver,
257 F.3d 132, 1139 (0oth Cir. 2001); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1012-13 (9th
Cir. 2000); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d lO85, 1093-94 (8th
Cir. 2000); Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131, 1138-39 (loth Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416-17 (2001) (acknowledging but declining to address defense);
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001) (drawing distinction); Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (same); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833
(explaining that Rust was based on that defense).
Numerous courts also have acknowledged the "government speech" defense, but have found it
inapplicable to the speech at issue. See Pelts & Skins, L.L.C. v. Landreneau, 365 F.3d 423, 429 (5th Cir.
2004); Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 28o (3d Cir. 2004); Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 2003); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 61o, 621 (4th Cir. 2002); Latino Officers Ass'n, N.Y., Inc. v. City of
New York, 196 F.3d 458, 468--69 (2d Cir. z999); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 14 F.3 d 429,
436 (9 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1989).
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month, several days before this Article was to go to the presses, the
Supreme Court handed down Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association,278 and for the first time explicitly considered the issue of
transparency in the government speech context.27 9 Over a vigorous
dissent, the Court held, among other things, that in mandatory speech
assessment cases the government may justify its actions as "government
speech" without having identified itself as the speaker or established that
reasonable listeners understand it to be speaking28 Because the basic
justification for affording the government broad latitude in
communicating its views lies in the expectation that citizens will
ultimately accept or reject those communications through mechanisms of
political accountability, the Court was wrong to reject a transparency
requirement.
At issue in Johanns was a federal program requiring beef producers
to pay $I-per-head cattle assessments to fund beef-related projects,
including promotional campaigns. The program required the producers
to pay the assessments primarily to state beef councils, which then
forwarded the proceeds to the Beef Promotion and Research Board
("Beef Board"), a group of beef producers and importers nominated by
trade associations and appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture."' An
Operating Committee of the Board, composed of ten Beef Board
members and ten representatives named by a federation of state beef
councils, designed the promotional campaigns, which were subject to the
Secretary's approval' 83 Several associations and individuals subject to the
assessments challenged the program, arguing, inter alia, that the
government could not, consistent with the First Amendment, compel
them to subsidize the promotional messages.21 4 The plaintiffs argued that,
by promoting beef as a generic commodity, the messages interfered with
their efforts to promote their own specific beef products (e.g., "American
beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef"). s5 In support
of their claim, plaintiffs relied on United States v. United Foods, Inc.,'86
which had invalidated on free speech grounds a similar mandatory
278. 544 U.S.- , 25 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
279. See id. at 2063-66 & n. 7; see also id. at 2068-73 (Souter, J, dissenting). Before Johanns, a few
courts had suggested, at least implicitly, that the "government speech" inquiry ought to take the
audience's perspective into account. See, e.g., Griffin, 288 F.3 d at 1325; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1155
(Briscoe, J., dissenting); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1094 n.9. No court had concluded,
however, that a particular message may be classified as "government speech" only if, at a minimum,
audiences understand the government to be speaking.
280. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063-66 & n. 7.
281. See id. at 2058.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id at 2059.
285. Id. at 2059--60.
286. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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assessment program that promoted mushrooms instead of beef."7 In
response, the federal government raised, among other things, the
"government speech" defense: the messages were properly understood
as government speech, not private beef producers' speech, and hence
were immune from First Amendment scrutiny.2m (Although the program
in United Foods was substantially identical to the beef program, the
government had raised the government speech defense belatedly in that
prior case, and the Court had declined to consider it.)2"
In Johanns, the district court and the Eighth Circuit rejected the
government speech defense and held the program unconstitutional."l
The district court reasoned that the Beef Board, which received the
assessments for advertising, was more "akin to a labor union or state bar
association whose members are representative of one segment of the
population," rather than "a governmental agency, representative of the
people.'29 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Board's advertising
was properly treated as private rather than government speech."' The
Eighth Circuit adopted a different approach, stating that the government
speech doctrine was inapplicable in the context of compelled subsidies
for speech. 93 According to the Eighth Circuit, the doctrine applied to
insulate the government only from First Amendment challenges
concerning the content of the government's speech, not from challenges
to mandatory contributions for the speech. '94
The Supreme Court reversed, accepting the government speech
defense. 5 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court made clear
that the defense applies to mandatory assessment challenges'
6
"'Compelled support of government'-even those programs of
government one does not approve-is of course perfectly constitutional,
as every taxpayer must attest," the Court stated, "fa]nd some
government programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a
position.""9 In other words, the Court explained, "'[c]ompelled support
of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled
287. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2059.
288. See id. at 2o6o.
289. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416-17.
290. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2o6o.
291. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2o7 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1004 (D.S.D. 2002)
(emphasis added).
292. See id.
293. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 721-21 (8th Cir. 2003).
294. See id.
295. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2o62-64. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in a companion
case, Neb. Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 541 U.S. io62 (2005), and issued a consolidated
opinion for the two cases.
296. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 261-62.
297. Id. at 2o62.
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support of government.''98 While the government generally may not
force individuals to fund the speech of other private actors, it may
require individuals to pay for its own speech, even speech that they find
offensive and disagreeable.' 9
The resolution in Johanns thus depended on the proper classification
of the promotional messages as either governmental or private."' And
that analysis, according to the Court, turned on the degree of the
government's control over the messages."' Although the Operating
Committee designed the messages, the Court noted, Congress and the
Secretary prescribed by law the messages' general outline, and federal
officials supervised the messages' development and exercised final
approval authority over them... "When, as here, the government sets the
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from non-governmental
sources in developing specific messages.'
The program's use of targeted assessments, rather than general
revenues, to fund the messages made no difference, the Court
continued.3 4 Although Congress did not allocate funding for the
messages as part of the budgetary process, a politically accountable
official, the Secretary of Agriculture, was responsible for the messages.3 5
Moreover, the fact that a specific group paid for the messages did not on
its own mean that the reasonable viewer would falsely attribute the
messages to that group. °6 Indeed, if there were a reasonable likelihood of
such erroneous attribution, the Court clarified, "the analysis would be
different."'' But in Johanns, the Court pointed out, because the federal
program did not "require[] attribution," the lower court improperly
invalidated the statute on its face.3°8 In the Court's view, so long as a
reasonable viewer would not attribute the messages to the challenging
parties, it mattered not whether the government made clear its
responsibility for the messages or falsely attributed the messages to
others." 9
298. Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 259 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment)) (alteration in original).
299. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2060.
300. See id. at 2o62-66.
301. See id. at 2062-63.
302. See id.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 2o63-66.
305. See id. at 2064.
306. See id. at 2064-65 & n.7-8.
307. See id. at 2o64 n.7.
308. Id. at 2o65 & n.7 (emphasis in original)
309. See id.
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Four Justices dissented from the Court's conclusion that the beef
messages were government speech." ' Concurring in the judgment on the
theory that the assessments were permissible economic regulation,
Justice Ginsburg noted that she would not categorize the messages
funded under the federal beef legislation, "but not attributed to the
Government as government speech," given the apparently inconsistent
"message the Government conveys in its own name."'3" Joined by
Justices Kennedy and Stevens, Justice Souter wrote the principal
dissent."2 Adopting a position similar to the one set forth in this Article,
Justice Souter maintained that transparency must be part of the
government speech defense analysis:
The [Court's] error is not that government speech can never justify
compelling a subsidy, but that a compelled subsidy should not bejustifiable by speech unless the government must put that speech
forward as its own.... I take the view that if government relies on the
government-speech doctrine to compel specific groups to fund speech
with targeted taxes, it must make itself politically accountable by
indicating that the content actually is a government message...."'
Rejecting the Court's reasoning that congressional authorization and
final government approval of the messages ensured democratic
accountability, Justice Souter argued that "[ilt means nothing that
Government officials control the message if that fact is never required to
be made apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it is
affirmatively concealed from them."" 4
Justice Souter clarified that not all taxpayers could raise a First
Amendment compelled subsidy challenge to government messages with
which they disagreed. "[W]hen government funds its speech with general
tax revenue, as it usually does, no individual taxpayer or group of
taxpayers can lay claim to a special, or even a particularly strong,
connection to the money spent (and hence to the speech funded)," and
thus there is no cognizable First Amendment harm.315 But when the
government pays for its speech with targeted taxes, Justice Souter
continued, "the particular interests of those singled out to pay the tax are
closely linked with the expression, and taxpayers who disagree with it
suffer a more acute limitation on their presumptive autonomy as
speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to say. '
Accordingly, only those individuals compelled to fund speech through
310. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2067 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2068 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
311. See id. at 2067 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
312. See id. at 2068 (Souter, J., dissenting).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2073.
315. Id. at 2075 & n.4.
316. Id.
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targeted assessments may raise a First Amendment challenge."7
This Article generally agrees with the analysis set forth in Justice
Souter's dissent. The Court ought to recognize a unique First
Amendment harm to individuals who may trace the use of their
particular tax payments to messages with which they disagree. But even
if one disagreed that the targeted nature of assessments gives rise to
constitutionally significant harms, another, perhaps more compelling
factor justified finding a cognizable compelled speech subsidy claim here.
The First Amendment objection stems not simply from the targeted
nature of the tax, but also from the type of organization to which the
assessments were due. The beef producers' claim was colorable because
the program orders one group of private individuals to pay assessments
for speech purposes to another group of private individuals. The federal
program requires producers and importers to pay not the United States
Treasury or any other federal governmental body, but, through state beef
councils (which may be either private or quasi-governmental in
character), a collection of representatives of private industry. 8 Though
the Court did not explicitly address the status of the Beef Board or the
Operating Committee,"' it did note that the government "solicit[ed]
317. See id. The Court maintained that Justice Souter incorrectly focused on "whether the ads'
audience realizes the government is speaking" instead of "the compelled assessment's purported
interference with respondents' First Amendment rights." Id. at 2064 n.7. Yet, as explained above,
Justice Souter did elaborate on the standard for cognizable First Amendment harm. In fact, the Court
itself erred in assuming that "government speech" was a pre-existing factual category, rather than a
legal construct or conclusion to immunize the government from what would otherwise appear to be
First Amendment violations. The Court announced, "As we hold today, respondents enjoy no right
not to fund government speech.., whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as
the government's." Id. But the countervailing claim here is not that individuals enjoy no right not to
fund government speech except when a reasonable viewer would not identify the speech as the
government's. Rather, the claim is that the government may not assert that funded speech is the
government's unless a reasonable viewer would identify it as being so. Put another way, the claim
recognizes that individuals enjoy no right not to fund government speech, but clarifies that courts may
not classify speech as government speech, or accept parties' invocation of the government speech
defense, unless the reasonable viewer would understand the subsidized message as originating from
the government. Although this distinction may appear to be one of semantics, it reflects the
recognition that there are no a priori categories of government speech and private speech and in fact
many forms of speech may be intertwined or involve both governmental and private elements.
318. See id. at 2058.
319. Though the government argued that the Beef Board is a governmental entity, see Brief for
Federal Petitioners at 22, Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 491 (2004) (No. 03-1164) 2004
WL 1905738, the Court recognized the governmental status of only the beef messages, not the Board
or Operating Committee. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
The government relied on Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 0I995), and
its definition of governmental actors subject to the restrictions of the First Amendment to argue that
the Beef Board was a governmental entity. See Brief for Federal Petitioners, supra, at 22. Yet that
argument elides the distinction between First Amendment restrictions on the one hand, and the
government-speech doctrine on the other: the former exists to limit unconstitutional conduct while the
latter serves to broaden the bounds of constitutional conduct (or justify what might otherwise appear
to be unconstitutional conduct). See Brief for Respondents at 33, Veneman, 2004 WL 2362873. It
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assistance from nongovernmental sources" to develop the promotional
beef messages.3 0 That observation strongly supports the view that those
entities are private.32 '
Relatedly, the government's prior defense of fundamentally
indistinguishable mandatory assessment programs in litigation leading to
two Supreme Court cases, Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.32
and United Foods, makes clear that messages generated by
representatives of private industry and funded by private parties cannot
naturally or comfortably be characterized as government speech. Indeed,
the government in Glickman expressly disavowed the government
speech defense in its brief before the Court.323 Four years later, in United
Foods, the government litigated the mushroom case all the way to the
Supreme Court before raising the government speech defense for the
first time.324 Had there been any doubt that the messages disseminated
were properly characterized as private, one would have expected the
government to have raised that defense in Glickman, or at least from the
start in United Foods. Put another way, it seems highly likely that, had
the beef producers challenged an assessment paid to the United States
Treasury or the Department of Agriculture, rather than one conveyed to
the Beef Board, the government would have asserted the government
speech defense immediately. The discussion here does not mean to
suggest that the Court should have considered in its analysis the fact that
the government had failed to raise the government defense in earlier
cases. Rather, it points to the omission only as evidence that there is a
strong basis to classify the subsidized messages as private.
What this case involved then was a claim by the government that
assessments for speech paid to private parties did not constitute
compelled subsidies for private speech, but government speech instead.
According to the Court, to cast the government speech defense over
what otherwise appears to be private speech, the government generally
need only prescribe by law an outline of the desired message and provide
would seem consistent with our constitutional tradition to define the scope of governmental actors
broadly with respect to First Amendment restrictions while at the same time narrowly construing the
entities that should be treated as governmental actors for purposes of the government speech doctrine.
320. Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063.
321. Notably the Beef Board presents itself to the public as a nongovernmental organization. See
Brief for Respondents at 28, Veneman, 2004 WL 2362873 (pointing out that the Board's website, which
is "a dot-com, not a dot-gov," states that "NO TAXPAYER OR GOVERNMENT FUNDS ARE
INVOLVED" in the checkoff program.).
322. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
323. See Brief for Petitioner at 25, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 1996 WL 494305
n.16 ("In the court of appeals, the United States did not advance the argument that the generic
advertising supported by the system of assessments on handlers constitutes 'government speech' that
does 'not implicate respondents' First Amendment rights.... We similarly do not rely on that
argument in this Court as an independent ground of decision.").
324. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416-17 (2ooi).
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for "final review" by a politically accountable official.3"5 Such a rule
hardly seems protective of individual First Amendment rights. As the
plaintiffs suggested in their brief to the Court, that view "take[s] the First
Amendment doctrine through the looking glass."32' Under the rule
announced in Johanns, the government may compel private individuals
to pay another group of private individuals to disseminate messages if
the government defines and must approve the latter group's messages."7
In other words, "the more severe the government's censorship, the less
scrutiny courts [] afford."32S
Of course the government regularly depends (and should be able to
depend) on private parties to help develop and convey its messages, and
it must be able to control the private parties to do so. Yet, as this Article
argues, the government should, consistent with constitutional principles,
ensure that the messages are identified as its own. And before courts
accept any government assertion that a challenged program is immune
from First Amendment scrutiny because it involves "government
speech," they should at least require the government to ensure that its
identity as speaker is transparent."9 In other words, underlying
constitutional principles should play a role in establishing the
appropriate default positions. The Court would require First
Amendment plaintiffs to show that reasonable viewers would mistakenly
attribute messages to the plaintiffs.33 But given the heightened interest in
protecting individual First Amendment rights, the government, rather
than private individuals, should at a minimum bear the burden of
demonstrating no mistaken attribution. Considering in addition the
larger structural interests set forth here of enhancing the government's
accountability for its messages, and the relatively limited costs of an
identification requirement, this Article maintains that the appropriate
standard should be even more speech-protective: require the government
to show that viewers or listeners understand that the message comes
from the government.
Another way of conceiving the identification requirement in the
mandatory assessment, and not the general revenue, context is as an
accommodation of competing interests. As discussed above, despite the
strong constitutional interest in transparency in government
325. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063.
326. See Brief for Respondents at 31, 2004 WL 2362873.
327. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2063-66.
328. See Brief for Respondents at 3I, Veneman, 2004 WL 2362873.
329. One might argue that, unlike in some other veiled government speech contexts, in the
mandatory assessment context, specific, aggrieved individuals will have sufficient incentives to
publicize and challenge the government program. Yet, as this Article argues, there are strong reasons
to require government disclosure in the speech context, even if one assumes that resort to political
process is an available option. See supra text accompanying notes 228-59.
330. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2064-65 n.7.
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communications, there are many reasons not to recognize a judicially
enforceable right to non-transparent communications.33 ' Yet if one could
raise a compelled speech subsidy challenge any time the government
funds speech through general revenues, then an identification
requirement would in effect create such an enforceable right. It may be
that, although there ought not to be a generally available cause of action,
there should be one at least when individuals can raise colorable claims
that the government is compelling them to subsidize another's speech. In
other words, contrary to the approach adopted by Johanns, the
governing standard ought to provide an aggressive prophylactic rule
protective of both individual speech interests and the broader structural
interests in transparency.
It bears emphasis that the concerns counseling against recognizing a
judicially enforceable right to transparent government communications
provide no reason not to consider transparency when evaluating the
government speech defense. Because the First Amendment, not a
freestanding transparency right, provides the basis for adjudication,
judicial recognition of the principle would not necessarily increase the
courts' workload appreciably. Insofar as the courts already entertain
First Amendment claims that require consideration of whether the
government can properly classify speech as its own, incorporating
transparency will become part of that analysis. Also, since the
government in those cases characterizes the contested speech as its own,
the judiciary would not be put in the difficult position of deciding, against
the government's contentions, that some individual or institution speaks
for the government. The courts would determine only if the government
had taken sufficient steps to assume responsibility for the speech and
thereby establish the inapplicability of individual First Amendment
rights. Finally, because such cases would not involve government officials
or employees speaking anonymously in their private capacities, there
would be no concerns about possible chilling effects.
Courts have also accepted the government speech defense in the
context of litigation challenging viewpoint-based government subsidies.
Consider, for instance, Rust v. Sullivan,33 mentioned at the start of this
Article. There, a group of federal funding grantees and doctors who
supervised the use of the funds challenged a federal regulation that
prohibited family planning projects from using federal funds to provide
counseling that would encourage the use of abortion as a method of
family planning.333 That prohibition violated the First Amendment, they
argued, because it constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination
331. See supra text accompanying notes 228-74.
332. 500 U.S. 173 (199I).
333. Id. at 178, 181.
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and "ai[med] at the suppression of dangerous ideas." '334 Emphasizing,
inter alia, the government's prerogative to fund programs selectively, the
Court rejected the claim and upheld the prohibition.335 In a later case, the
Court clarified that the Rust holding was predicated on the finding that
the expression at issue was government speech, not the speech of the
service providers in the federal program.336 The Court explained,
the government did not create a program to encourage private speech
but instead used private speakers to transmit specific information
pertaining to its own program.... [W]hen the government disburses
public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it
may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.337
As others have pointed out, a fundamental problem with the Rust
decision is that the patients themselves did not necessarily understand
the doctors or other family planning counselors to be delivering a
governmental message; instead, it was highly likely that the patients
understood the doctors and counselors to be speaking independently, in
accord with their professional training and expertise."' While the Rust
majority noted that, "[n]othing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to
represent as his own any opinion that he does not hold," and that "[t]he
doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is
simply beyond the scope of the program," '339 it was also true that nothing
in the regulations required the doctors to disclose the government's role
in restricting the scope of their counseling. As in the mandatory
assessment context, here, the key factor is what the proper default
condition is when the government uses private parties to deliver its
messages. According to the transparency principle, courts should require
disclosure of the governmental role as a precondition to accepting the
categorization of any speech as government speech.
As the type of subsidized speech challenged in Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez34 makes clear, however, disclosure alone may not always
334- Id. at 192 (internal quotations omitted).
335. Id. at 193 ("The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.").
336. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
337. Id. (discussing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 196-200).
338. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 1t6, at 1396-97; Greene, supra note 37, at 5o; Post,
supra note 41, at 174. Scholars have relatedly argued that Rust was wrongly decided because the
government may not, consistent with the Constitution, compromise the institutional independence of
doctors in communicating with their patients. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 41, at 743-47; Robert D.
Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL R-rs.
J. 787 (1996); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1999).
339. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
340. 531 U.S. 533 (2OO).
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suffice to establish the government as speaker. At issue there was a
restriction that prohibited recipients of Legal Service Corporation
("LSC") grants from providing legal representation for indigent clients if
that representation involved an effort to amend or otherwise challenge
existing law.34' In striking down the restriction, the Court explained, inter
alia, that the subsidy program facilitated private speech, not government
speech.342 "The LSC-funded attorney speaks on behalf of the client in a
claim against the government for welfare benefits. The lawyer is not the
government's speaker."343 One might initially respond that, so long as the
lawyer disclosed to the client the restrictions on the types of arguments
that he could raise, the lawyer's speech ought to be characterized as
government speech. But that mistakes the nature of the speech at issue.
The government provided funding to support lawyers' or clients' claims
to courts. The recipient of the purported governmental speech is the
judge or jury, not the client. In the institutional context of the courts, no
degree of disclosure would have led a judge or jury to accept the lawyer's
speech to be that of the government. To the contrary, a court necessarily
would expect, and require, the lawyer to speak on behalf of his client.
By examining the contested speech from the perspective of whom
listeners understand to be speaking-as the transparency inquiry would
have us do-we can thus reconcile what others have suggested to be
irreconcilable in Rust and Velazquez: the Court's reasoning about the
nature of the subsidized speech of the family planning counselor and
doctors, on the one hand, and of the legal services lawyers, on the other.
As Justice Scalia wrote in dissent:
If the private doctors' confidential advice to their patients at issue in
Rust constituted "government speech," it is hard to imagine what
subsidized speech would not be government speech. Moreover, the
majority's contention that subsidized speech in these cases is not
government speech because the lawyers have a professional obligation
to represent the interests of their clients founders on the reality that
the doctors in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests
of their patients .... Even respondents agree that "the true speaker in
Rust was not the government, but the doctor. 34
While Justice Scalia is correct that the Court should have recognized
that the speaker in Rust was the doctor, that does not mean that the
parallel fiduciary responsibilities of the doctors and lawyers established
that the nature of their speech, as private or governmental, was
necessarily the same. In Rust, the doctors could have disclosed to the
patients that they were providing counseling not as doctors, or at least
341. Id. at 537-38.
342. Id. at 542.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not in accordance with the full freedom normally accorded those in their
profession, but instead as governmental messengers.345 Had they done so,
then the recipients would have understood the speech to be the
government's, and the Court could have reasonably concluded that the
subsidized speech was government speech. 46 In Velazquez, by contrast,
disclosure would not have led the recipients--the courts- to understand
the subsidized speech to be the government's, and the Court thus could
not have reasonably found the contested speech to be government
speech. In other words, because the clients in Velazquez were not the
intended listeners of the subsidized speech, the parallel fiduciary
obligations of doctors and lawyers to their clients were not
determinative.
3. The Reasonable Recipient Standard
The question what a court's transparency inquiry should look like
naturally arises. This inquiry should focus on the perspective of the
reasonable recipient of the purported government speech. Only if a
reasonable recipient understands that the government bears
responsibility for a communication should a court conclude that the
contested speech is "government speech." This emphasis on the receipt,
or effect, of government communications flows naturally from concerns
about political accountability. As this Article has made clear, the basic
reason we afford governments broad latitude in communicating is the
expectation that the citizenry will hold the government accountable for
its exercise of its communicative powers. Because the citizenry may do so
only when it knows what the government is saying, citizens must be able
to identify speech for which the government is responsible.
Courts should adopt a standard of reasonableness appropriate for
those likely to receive a message. Such a standard comports with the
political accountability rationale for the transparency requirement. Thus,
if the likely recipients of a government message include those who
understand only Spanish or are illiterate, the government must
undertake sufficient efforts to ensure that those recipients will
understand the government's responsibility for the speech. 47
Furthermore, even if the likely recipients are those who cannot vote in
345. See Greene, supra note 37, at 50; Post, supra note 41, at 174 n.128.
346. Some might question whether people would in fact understand such a disclosure. Even if
doctors were to disclose government restrictions clearly, as long as they continue to wear their white
coats and stethoscopes and treat patients in hospitals or clinics, it is possible that some patients would
nevertheless assume that the doctors would speak freely and fully in the patients' best interests. If the
reasonable recipient of the message would not understand the disclosure, then the disclosure alone
may not suffice to establish the government as speaker.
347. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-201 (I99I) (ignoring the likelihood that most women
receiving family planning counseling at the public clinics would have limited medical sophistication
and resources).
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the political process, such as children or non-citizens, the standard of
reasonableness should nevertheless focus on their perspective."
Although they themselves cannot vote, they can inform other
individuals, who can vote, of the government's speech efforts, and those
individuals may be just as concerned about the government's efforts to
persuade others as its efforts to persuade themselves.349
The religion context provides an instructive analogy for the
reasonable recipient standard. One of the principal ways in which courts
assess alleged violations of the Establishment Clause is to focus on the
perspective of the "reasonable observer." A court asks "whether the
practice in question creates the appearance of endorsement to the
reasonable observer.""35 With respect to displays of religious symbols by
private parties on public property, for instance, four Justices of the Court
have embraced a test quite similar to the one set forth here.35' There,
because of the "crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect,'35 a court must determine whether a reasonable observer would
interpret the display's symbolic endorsement of religion to constitute
private speech or government speech.353 Regardless of the government's
intent, if a reasonable observer would "mistake private, unattended
religious displays in a public forum for government speech endorsing
religion," then a court would find the displays to be "government
speech" for Establishment Clause purposes and thus hold them
unconstitutional.354
Numerous commentators have criticized the reasonable observer
standard as too difficult to apply.35 The inquiry into what a reasonable
348. In the Establishment Clause context, the Court has focused on the reasonable perceptions of
a child to evaluate actions alleged to endorse religion in public schools. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573,592-94 (1989); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985).
349. See W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 PUB. OPINION 0. 1
(1983) (explaining that people often expect persuasive messages to have a greater effect on third
parties than on themselves and then take action to address that effect).
350. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 505 U.S. 753, 787 ('995) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (citing numerous cases); see also Lamb's Chapel, 5o8 U.S. at 395; Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1990).
350. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ.); id.
at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
353. See id. at 763; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,69o (984).
354. As Justice O'Connor opined, where the display has the effect of being a governmental
message, even if a government actor neither intends nor actively encourages that result, an
Establishment Clause violation has occurred. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 785 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
355. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, I8 J. L. & POL.
499 (2oo2); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463,
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observer, or reasonable recipient, would perceive can indeed be elusive.
Yet, unlike in the religion context, in the government speech context, the
adoption of a rebuttable presumption may help alleviate some of the
standard's seeming indeterminacy. 356 Courts should presume that a
reasonable recipient would attribute speech to the individual delivering
the message, or an institution that she represents. In other words, courts
should presume that a reasonable recipient would understand non-
governmental speakers to convey messages on their own, rather than the
government's, behalf.357 To rebut that presumption, the government
would bear the burden of demonstrating that a reasonable recipient of a
message would understand the message to be the government's. That it is
far easier for a speaker to disclose the identity of the individual or
institution for whom she speaks, than for a listener to discern that
identity, makes this presumption and allocation of proof sensible.
As a final matter, it should be noted that the transparency analysis,
and its implications for the government speech/private speech
distinction, does not by itself resolve all questions regarding government
communications. In other words, following the transparency principle
does not obviate the need for compliance with other First Amendment
requirements. For example, a government may not control the speech of
government employees or government contractors simply by asserting
that they are government speakers and having them disclose that fact to
listeners. The Supreme Court has already developed an employee speech
doctrine158 and a related government contractor speech doctrine359 that
seek to balance the government's interest as an employer or contractor
with a private party's First Amendment rights to speak on matters of
public concern, and the transparency analysis is not meant to displace
that inquiry. Similarly, the Constitution restricts some governmental
expression involving religion 36° and elections,"' yet the concerns go well
478-79; William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 532-38 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 292-93 (1987).
356. Adopting a presumption in the religion context raises more difficulties because of the
competing concerns of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause: whereas the former
counsels against a presumption that the contested speech is private and hence permissible, the latter
cautions against a presumption that the disputed speech is the government's and hence impermissible.
357. Cf Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring) ("When an individual speaks in a
public forum, it is reasonable for an observer to attribute the speech, first and foremost, to the
speaker....").
358. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (I968). For government employees in the university setting, the Supreme
Court has also developed a distinct and different academic freedom principle. See Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967).
359. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (adopting Pickering analysis).
360. See supra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
361. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524-26 (2001).
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beyond the issue of transparency. Thus, even if the government
transparently advocated the tenets of Protestantism over those of
Judaism, or the election of Republicans versus Democrats, the fact of
transparency would not insulate those communications from
constitutional challenge.
In any event, transparency remains an important factor for
understanding the proper bounds of government communications. The
transparency requirement has roots in the Constitution's fundamental
commitment to political accountability and indeed undergirds the
legitimacy of government communications, and thus should be respected
by all governmental actors. Also, even though the transparency
distinction will not apply in all First Amendment claims, it will be
relevant in many cases, and should be outcome-determinative in some.
Accordingly, the principle of transparency in government
communications should inform the work of all parts of the government.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the White House's position on its
responsibility for informing viewers of its role in producing the news
videos and encouraging the anti-drug entertainment programs was
wrong. It was the "government's place" to notify the viewers. In fact, the
task of doing so was a matter of constitutional dimension. As this Article
has made clear, when the government participates in public debate, it
should let the people know that it is participating. By identifying what it
says and how it does so, the government gives the people the means to
process official messages free from false assumptions and the means to
hold the government accountable for those messages. Transparency is
indispensable to the legitimacy not only of government communications
but of government itself.
This Article has also made clear that, notwithstanding its
constitutional basis, the transparency principle does not give rise to a
judicially enforceable right. So, the courts should not entertain claims by
individuals such as the viewers of the news videos and anti-drug
programs who assert that the government has violated their
constitutional rights. But the transparency principle does warrant judicial
concern. In mandatory assessment cases or government subsidy cases
like Rust v. Sullivan, in which a party alleges that the government is
violating its First Amendment speech rights, and the government defends
on the grounds that the contested speech is not private speech but
"government speech"-that the government, in other words, is merely
exercising its broad discretion to speak-the courts ought to incorporate
the element of transparency into their analysis. The Supreme Court
should thus rethink its analysis in Johanns and clarify that, in order to
avail itself of that defense, the government must establish, at a minimum,
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that the reasonable recipient of the speech understands the
communication to come from the government.
This Article has further clarified that the transparency principle
ought not apply to government employees, such as Chief Justice John
Marshall, whom one might reasonably conclude speak primarily in their
private capacities. The transparency principle makes the government
accountable to the public for its speech activities, but should not stifle
anonymous or pseudonymous speech in general. Because of the need to
protect individual speech rights, including the rights of those who serve
in the government's employ, the transparency principle should apply
only in those employee speech cases in which it appears clear that the
individual speaks in his official capacity. Applying it more broadly would
have a substantial chilling effect on government officials and employees
who wish to communicate their personal views, and would thereby
impose too great a burden on individual First Amendment rights.
Finally, turning from the Article's content to its methodology, the
argument for transparency here has drawn on social science findings
concerning how people actually process and receive information. This
effort illustrates that normative analyses of government communications
could benefit considerably from an enhanced understanding of that
process. There are many other issues, both in the area of government
communications and in other areas of the law, that might benefit from
similar approaches.362 In other words, in a variety of contexts, the law
incorporates, or ought to incorporate, assumptions about people's
362. For example, as discussed above, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
calls in certain circumstances for an analysis of the reasonable observer's perceptions about whether
particular conduct amounts to a state endorsement of religion. See supra Part.V.B.3. In discussing that
standard in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), Justice Breyer, for
example, recently emphasized the importance of developing a factual record to determine whether
children who attended a public school perceived private religious activities on their school premises as
an official endorsement of religion. Id. at 127, 128 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Although additional
factual findings might have been useful there, a more fully developed understanding of the cognitive
processes by which people (and children in particular) perceive government action would have
provided the essential framework to analyze those facts.
Similarly, an approach based upon understanding how people actually process and receive
information could inform questions in the state action context. The Court's analysis in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), for example, suggests a significant role for this
kind of approach. There, the Court held that race discrimination by a privately-owned restaurant that
leased space in a building owned by a municipal parking authority was impermissible state action. Id.
at 717. In reaching that decision, the Court pointed to, among other things, the "official signs
indicating the public character of the building," "the state and national flags" that "flew from
mastheads on the roof," and "the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a
public building." Id. at 720, 724. The parking authority, the Court stressed, "place[d] its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id. at 725. Burton suggests that the state
action question turns, at least in part, on how people understand the action in question. The case
further implies that the resolution of that question turns upon not only verbal cues, but visual cues as
well.
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perceptions. The law may ask, for example, do people perceive a speaker
to be a government speaker, or an actor to be a governmental actor? Or,
do people interpret the action in question to bear the government's
imprimatur? Although not every legal question should turn on
perceptions, sometimes perceptions do matter. In those circumstances,
legal analysis will necessarily benefit from a better understanding of what
and how people actually perceive.
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